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Abstract  
  
  
The aim of this thesis is to establish that there is no metaphysical account of personal identity that 
requires us to regard gender as essential to our identities. I shall begin by examining forms of 
essentialism as well as rejections of essentialism, relating these theories to the issue at hand.  
Secondly, I shall evaluate the social existence of gender and the impact it has upon individual lives 
and communities. I shall go on to evaluate psychological accounts of identity to determine how  
gender adheres with understandings of personal identity as a psychological continuity. I will then 
look to the antithesis of such views and examine physiological accounts of identity, again relating  
these to the issues of gender. Finally, I shall compare what each of these theories tells us about the  
existence of gender in our lives and conclude that gender is a social construct, and that since no 
legitimate metaphysical account of identity encourages belief in gender essentialism, harmful 
prevalent attitudes to gender within society are ultimately irrational.  
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Gender is an omnipresent concept within our society, it influences politics, personal relations and 
even how we are perceived. My endeavour within this thesis is to understand how gender impacts 
upon personal identity. Is gender part of who we are? Would we be the same person if our gender 
changed? In other words, what I am attempting to establish, is whether or not gender is an essential 
part of our existence, our identity. A problem with the current discussions on gender essentialism is 
the lack of clarity about the position gender upholds in our lives. Therefore, my thesis is concerned 
with truly understanding whether, or not, gender is essential to our personal identity. I will begin to 
address this through the discussion of “Gender- essentialism”- I will be analysing Essentialist theories 
from philosophers such as Aristotle and John Locke and applying their theories to the concept of 
gender- in order to demonstrate that there is no version of “Gender-Essentialism” that does not 
have its own fatal complications. This claim will be supported by my discussion of psychological and 
sociological theories of gender and sex - like the works of Judith Butler and Simone De Beauvoir, for 
example)- which will begin to show that gender is not characteristic of our existence at all, but a 
reflection of the society we live in. I will then go on to look at Western theories of personal identity 
in order to understand the role that gender plays with in our personal construction- however this 
will also demonstrate how problematic it is to try and align theories of gender with theories of 
personal identity. Compiling all of these ideas will lead me to introduce the notion that gender 
cannot be satisfactorily explained through essentialism or within our personal identity because, in 
fact, gender exists as part of our social identity- an important element of our existence but, 
nonetheless fundamentally, different from our personal identities. The conclusion of my thesis will, 
ultimately, attempt to show that there is no theory of personal identity that requires us to think that 
gender is essential to our identities and that the existence of gender is perpetuated through social 
traditions and perceived obligations, rather than through its essential existence in our personal 
identities.   
  
  
  
Arist-essentialism.  
  
  
Aristotle’s “History of animals” discusses the idea of a biological gender difference, for example he 
states, “while within the womb, the female infant accomplishes the whole development of its parts 
more slowly than the male, and more frequently than the man- child takes ten months to come to 
perfection,” ( (Aristotle, 350 BC/2008, p. 126). This suggests that one’s development and 
composition is different, depending on one’s sex. Aristotle goes on to also explain how women are 
“more likely to be moved to tears and be sensitive whereas men are most likely to be brave and 
strong” (Aristotle, 350 BC/2008, p.130) as well as describing various other ways that men and 
women differ in their temperament. This is where my query begins- if a man and a woman are 
formed differently in the womb and continue to develop differently when they are born, then 
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biological sex and composition must dictate our personality and behaviour. If this is to be accepted, 
then we are highlighting an integral difference between the sexes in a physical and psychological 
sense. Do these differences, which have affected us since the day we were born, construct part of 
“who we are”? Could our gender change and yet we still be classed as the same person? Whether or 
not we decide to agree with Aristotle’s differentiation of gender is a different debate, but what we 
need to take from this is the fact that, according to this theory, our biological sex is sculpting our 
development whilst we are in the womb. Therefore, if genders dictate our biology and psychology, 
then it seems logical to suggest that gender is also imperative to our being. If I, a woman, destined to 
be more sensitive and emotional, by some phenomenon became a man, then Aristotle suggests I 
would then, just by changing from a woman to a man, more than likely become more independent 
and brave- quite the opposite of the former. Eventually this would impact on my own thoughts and 
actions as well as other people’s opinions and acceptance of me. I would no longer menstruate, have 
the capacity to bear a child or lactate, I would be regarded differently in a work environment. 
Conclusively, this is suggesting that I would not be the same person as a man that I was as a woman. 
If this is so, then our gender is integral as part of us. This reflects the ideas of Aristotelian 
essentialism. Aristotle's account of essences is distinct from that offered by Platonists (who do not 
give such a central role to causal explanation) Furthermore, whilst Aristotle's essences are part of 
the fabric of reality, “they can be grasped only by those with certain definitional and explanatory 
practices,” (Charles, 2002, p. 7). Aristotelian Essentialism which was born around the question: 
“What is it?” expands into a question about the unity and organization of material parts into a new 
individual. Using the analogy of a house (Witt, 2011, p. 13) Aristotelian thinking teaches us to ask; 
Why do these basic materials constitute a house? The answer is that they realize the functional 
property that defines being a house, which is to shelter humans and animals. Being a shelter for 
humans and animals is what makes these materials a house rather than a collection of supplies or 
just a sum of parts. The house’s functional property explains why a new, unified individual exists at 
all. (Witt, 2011, p. 6). The example of the house shows that, For Aristotle, the essence is the cause of 
being of the individual whose essence it is (Witt, 2011, p. 14) so in other words that essence is the 
entity that binds all the raw materials together which allows those materials to function as a house, 
rather than remaining a pile of rubble.  
When discussing essentialism in relation to humans, we would say that “for a man to be is for him to 
be characterized by those predicates which makes something a man” (Dahl, 1997, p. 233). If we say 
then, for example, that for a man to be a man he needs to have the male, biological sexual organs 
then if the person in question did not have these organs, they could not be a man. Furthermore, all 
substances fall under a substance kind, where the essence of that substance (what it is for that 
substance to be) at least includes the essence of its substance kind (what it is for something to be a 
thing of that kind) (Dahl, 1997, p. 234).  
Norman O’Dahl discusses the query that if, A is said of a particular “A kath' hauto ("with respect to 
itself' or essentially)” (Dahl, 1997, p. 234), then the essence of that particular A (what it is for that 
particular A to be) will at least include the essence of the kind A (what it is for something to be an A). 
The question we must raise now is whether Aristotle would maintain that the essence of A includes 
the essence of the kind A for every kind A; would he maintain this when A is said of a subject “kata 
sumbebewos ("with respect to an accident" or accidentally)” (Dahl, 1997, p. 234)? The example he 
illustrates for this point is, would Aristotle say that what it is for a pale man to be includes what it is 
to fall under the kind of pale man (Dahl, 1997, p. 234)?  
At first glance, one would perhaps think that Aristotle would not, because, if a pale man is indeed a 
man who just happens to be pale (and if what it is to be of the kind “Pale man” includes what it is to 
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be pale) then it seems as though the essence of the Kind “Pale man” will not be part of what it is for 
a particular man to be pale. In more basic terms, a man who happens to be pale can exist without 
being pale, if the next morning he awoke with a red complexion he would not cease to exist nor exist 
as a different entity, he would just no longer be pale. Whereas to be part of the kind “Pale man” you 
cannot be part of said species without being pale so there is no possibility of the man existing as 
anything but pale. However, it has also been said that this is the wrong approach to this question. 
Gareth Matthews, for example, states that when Aristotle talks of a pale man, he isn’t talking about 
a man who just happens to be pale. He instead refers to the accidental compound which consists of 
a man and an accident, i.e. his pallor. The accidental compound of a man and his pallor cannot exist 
without being characterized by what it is to be a compound of that sort (Dahl, 1997, p. 235).  
The analogy of the pale man highlights an integral, essential difference which is key to my current 
endeavour; that is, that there is an opposition between what is essential to the kind/species to 
which an individual belongs and to the essence of the individual. According to this idea then, the 
essential qualities for the existence within a Biological kind may be required to be part or not part of 
a sex- i.e. the biological organs you have maybe essential when indicating to be either male or 
female, however, they are not essential to the self. Therefore, let’s say for an example that Subject A 
is biologically male and to be male he essentially needs the biological form in order to be essentially 
“male-kind”. Yet, it is not essential in Subject A’s existence to have those sexual organs, he can 
continue to exist without those organs, his organs are just an accidental compound of a person and 
the flesh they were born with and so therefore Subject A can exist without being male meaning that 
biological sex is not essential to one’s existence.  
Aristotle, however, did not classify the genders separately, essence is relating to species and 
according to Aristotle, the sex you are born with will not affect the species you are (Matthews, 1990, 
p. 255), so as long as Subject A had the essential qualities of being human, it would not matter what 
biological sex they were assigned so long as they had the essential qualities needed to be a human 
being. Aristotle accepts that although human beings might differ in physical stature, personality, and 
temperament. He demonstrated that in light of the differences between the two genders it is 
unmistakable that they are still two parts of a whole- he calls it the “Complementarity  
Theory” (Matthews, p.18, 1990)- “Between man and wife friendship seems to exist by nature; for 
man is naturally inclined to form couples-even more than to form cities, inasmuch as the household 
is earlier and more necessary than the city . . . human beings live together not only for the sake of 
reproduction but also for the various purposes of life” (Matthews,p.19,1990). In this way, Aristotle is 
demonstrating how although there are remarkable differences between men and women, these 
differences are complementary with each other, which creates a kind of harmony.  
Furthermore, Aristotelian considerations are also born around the concept of change. In Western 
philosophy, it has always been a philosophical focus to try and understand the idea of permanence 
amongst an ever-changing, ever-growing world. The key question, of this consideration, is how we 
can still be classifiable as the same person when since the day we were born we have done and 
experienced nothing but change both biologically and environmentally. We can be fairly certain that 
we look very different today as adults, then we did as infants, possibly unrecognisable. Aristotle’s 
answer to this question was distinguishing between two types of change-  
Type one- “alteration, locomotion, growth and diminution” which fundamentally means that the 
object remains the same substantially, or essentially, throughout changes in colour, location or 
environment, etc (Copi, 1954, p. 708)  
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Type two- “substantial change” is when the essential property disappears. For example, if a wooden 
table was to burn, then the ashes and gasses left are not variants of the table, but not a table at all.  
The second version of change is when the object or entity ceases to exist by complete destruction or 
ceasing to exist because of the loss of its essence. If then, the object in some way changes, but 
essentially remains the same, it means that within every object some properties can change without 
directly impacting the existence of an entity. On the other hand, the fact that when other, necessary, 
properties of the same entity change it actually results in the ceasing of the existence of that entity- 
these properties are what are referred to as the essence. The essence is all the essential properties 
of a substance combined. This leads to the separation of two types, of property and attribute -so if it 
ceased to exist then it would cause the existence of the said object to cease too. An accident, on the 
other hand, is the attributes of an object that can change, it is the attributes that change but leave 
the original object identifiably and substantially the same (Copi, 1954, p. 708). Due to the nature of 
their being, we can state that knowledge of essence is more important than knowledge of accidents- 
“we think we know things most fully when what it is, e.g., what man is or what fire is rather than 
when we know it’s quality, it’s quantity or its place; since we know each of those predicates also only 
when we know what quality or quantity is” (Aristotle, 1999, p.22). This leads us to conclude that if 
some attributes of objects are epistemologically significant and others are not then the former must 
constitute the “real nature of things” and the rest must be relegated to some less ultimate category 
(Copi, 1954, p. 708).  
  
  
Lockean Essentialism  
  
  
Aristotelian thinking is also omnipresent throughout John Locke’s investigation into essentialism as 
two different variations, real and nominal essences. A real essence, according to Locke, is a set of 
properties that determine all the other properties within an entity and since all properties depend 
on the real essence, only a change in this said essence could cause a change within the entity. This is 
one of the biggest differences between Aristotelian and Lockean thought, as Locke states that the 
essential properties of an object are not retained during change, as it takes the essence changing for 
the entity to change (Copi, 1954, p. 712). Seeing as Locke believed that real essences were actually 
unknowable (real essences are micro-properties: an internal entity of unobservable primary 
qualities), it meant that the rest of his work became about understanding what nominal essence is. 
“The nominal essence of a horse is the abstract idea that "horse" stands for,” (Barclay, 1967, p. 79). 
Locke describes, in other words that a nominal essence is the idea of a substance which, according 
to Locke, is a complex idea made up of simple ideas which go together constantly –“The mind being, 
as I have declared, furnished with a great number of the simple ideas, conveyed in by the senses as 
they are found in exterior things, or by reflection on its own operations, takes notice also that a 
certain number of these simple ideas go constantly together; which being presumed to belong to 
one thing” (Locke, 1690, p. 184). Both abstract and general ideas regarding the sort or species of 
particular entities are created from complex ideas of certain substances that resemble each other by 
dismissing what is unique about each individual thing whilst retaining what is common about each 
member of a species. So, to use the example of the horse, we are not concerned by the colour of an 
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individual animal, but instead focus on the fact that all horses have four legs and make a certain 
sound and eat an herbivorous diet. Such an abstract idea determines a sort or species, and is called a 
"nominal essence," for "everything contained in that idea is essential to that sort,"(Locke,1690, 
p.229).  
Let us refer to how Aristotle compared between Essence and Accident when we review the way 
Locke considered his nominal essence. In the first instance, a substance of a certain species can 
change as long as the idea is not part of the nominal essence and the original entity will still be 
recognizable as the same original entity; so, if the horse’s hair is dyed by its owner so it was 
originally a chestnut brown horse and now it is dyed white, this will not alter the horse in terms of 
the nominal essence as it still has the telling features of a horse. However, if something in relation to 
the nominal essence does in some way change then the entity itself will be regarded as quite 
different. So, if the horse grew hands and feet in place of its hooves, then this would be an alteration 
of properties determinative of the idea of what a horse is and so would be a contrast to what the 
nominal essence of a horse is. Secondly, the nominal essence (much like Aristotelian concepts of 
essence) is important to comprehend than any other property of the entity. To have knowledge is to 
know what sort of thing something is and to know the nominal essence is to know this. Furthermore, 
Locke states that the most identifiable quality is the most knowable and so the main ingredient in 
the nominal essence- “One must know the nominal essence if one is to ever know the truth about 
any single thing” (Copi, 1954, p. 714).  
  
  
Quinean Essentialism  
  
  
The idea of essentialism is denied by many philosophers nowadays and most famously by W.V. 
Quine. In his article “The Two Dogmas of Empiricism” Quine rejects the existence of analyticity, 
which explains much about his hostility to essence, as we shall see. To begin, he divides analyticity 
into two terms: The first version is based on logical truths-Any statements that remain true 
regardless of how we interpret the statements non-logical particles (the logical operators). So, an 
expression like “No, Not-X is X” is so no matter how we interpret it – for example, “No, not- cat is a 
cat”.  
The second type is based around synonymous terms – if we use the expression “No bachelor is 
married”, the meanings of the word bachelor and unmarried are synonymous. However, we can turn 
this expression into a logical truth by changing the word “bachelor” with its synonym “unmarried 
man”. This would result in a new expression – No unmarried man is married, which of course, still 
means the same as the original statement. However, we need to be able to define and understand 
the term synonymy and due to the difficult nature of defining synonymy, this is the focus of the rest 
of Quine’s essay.  
Quine poses a different connection between language and experience which suggests that language 
doesn’t consist of a collection of synthetic and analytic statements, he instead views language as a 
holistic system. Within this system, all statements are answerable to experiences so “our statements 
about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience not individually but only as a 
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corporate body’ (Quine, p.42,1953). He sees no reason to derive observational consequences from 
individual sentences as there is always a sort of choice about which beliefs to adjust in light of 
experience. For example, “if I believe the Vixen has lost its tail, but then see it flick up, then I do not 
necessarily have to retract the original belief, since in the circumstances it may seem more likely that 
I am hallucinating,” (Tartaglia, p.123, 2007). If we cannot get observational consequences from 
individual sentences, then we cannot determine which sentences are entirely lacking in 
observational consequences.  
Within this system, Quine believes that we should reject analyticity in favour of the centrality to a 
belief system, in the sense of having the largest number of inferential connections to other beliefs in 
the overall system. To all the statements that were formerly classed as analytic, Quine states they 
are not actually immune to experience, but insulated from it, as they are the statements closest to 
the centre of the belief system and hence the least likely to be revised in light of experience, “given 
the knock-on effects such revisions would have on the system as a whole” (Tartaglia, p.121, 2007).So 
then, it can’t be necessarily true that a man has a certain kind of body, just because of what the 
word ‘man’ means; or in other words to say that Jane is a woman is analytically true, as a result of 
our intention when we speak of Jane (for example, referring to a biological female born on a certain 
day.) If it’s not analytically true that a man has a certain biological form, then it can’t be necessary 
that he has to have that form, in order to be a man.  
  
  
Kripkean essentialism  
  
  
Descriptivism is the view that the meaning or semantic content of a proper name is given by the 
descriptions associated with it by speakers, while their referents are determined to be the objects 
that satisfy these descriptions (Kripke,1972, p.26). So basically, for every name, there is a collection 
of descriptions associated with that name that constitutes the meaning of that name. Bertrand 
Russell and Gottlob Frege have both been associated with the descriptivist theory, which is 
sometimes called the Frege–Russell view (Kripke, 1972, p. 27). Frege’s version of the theory was 
formulated in reaction to problems with his original theory of meaning or reference -which entailed 
that sentences with empty proper names cannot have a meaning. Yet a sentence containing the 
name 'Odysseus' is intelligible, and therefore has a sense, even though there is no individual object 
(its reference) to which the name corresponds. Also, the sense of different names is different, even 
when their reference is the same. Frege said that if an identity statement such as "Hesperus is 
Phosphorus" is to be informative, the proper names flanking the identity sign must have a different 
meaning or sense. But, if the statement is true, they must have the same reference.  
Saul Kripke, on the other hand, criticises the Descriptivist theory in his famous work “Naming and 
Necessity” (Kripke, 1972, p. 91). He asks us to think of Gödel and states that the only description 
most people associate with him is the discovery of the incompleteness of arithmetic. He goes on to 
imagine that (unbeknown to everyone other than Gödel) it was actually Schmitt who made said 
discovery and that in fact, Gödel stole his work. So, if this were true, is an ordinary person actually 
referring to Schmitt or Gödel when he uses the name “Gödel”? According to the descriptivist 
viewpoint, Schmitt is the referent as he fits the description of the man who discovered the 
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incompleteness of arithmetic. Yet, Kripke thinks that in fact, it is, of course, Gödel, since it seems 
highly implausible that people could talk about Schmitt without having any idea that the man ever 
existed. For Kripke, the name ‘Gödel’ refers to Gödel in virtue of causal connections between 
individual uses of the name and the man himself). Putnam made a similar point when he referred to 
a ‘division of linguistic labour’, the idea again being that reference is determined by causal links 
within society, rather than based on the descriptions that individuals associate with terms (Putnam 
1975).  
Furthermore, Kripke offered up what has come to be known as “the modal argument” (or argument 
from rigidity) against descriptivism. Consider the name ‘’Aristotle’’ and the descriptions “the 
greatest student of Plato’’, “the founder of logic” and “the teacher of Alexander.” Aristotle satisfies 
all of the descriptions (and many of the others we commonly associate with him), but it is not a 
necessary truth that if Aristotle existed then Aristotle was anyone, or all, of these descriptions. 
Aristotle might well have existed without doing any single one of the things he is known for. He 
might have existed and not have become known to posterity at all or he might have died in infancy.  
The second argument employed by Kripke has come to be called the ‘’epistemic argument” or “the 
argument from unwanted necessity, (Sabbarton-Leary, 2010, p. 9)”. This is simply the observation 
that if the meaning of ‘’Angela Merkel’’ is “the Chancellor of Germany”, then “Angela is the 
Chancellor of Germany” should seem to the average person to be a priori, analytic, and trivial, as if 
falling out of the meaning of “Angela Merkel” just as “unmarried male” falls out of the meaning of 
“bachelor.” If this is correct, then the properties of Angela Merkel should be known a priori by the 
speaker (Sabbarton-Leary, 2010, p. 10). However, this is not true because we need experience to 
know who the Chancellor of Germany is.  
Kripke then goes on to introduce the concept of a Rigid Designator- he describes this as a term with 
the same reference in all possible worlds - “Let’s call something a rigid designator if in every possible 
world it designates the same object.” (Kripke, 1972, p. 49) Kripke believes that names are Rigid 
Designators- “One of the intuitive theses I will maintain in these talks is that names are rigid 
designators. Certainly, they seem to satisfy the intuitive test mentioned above: although someone 
other than the U. S. President in 1970 might have been the U. S. President in 1970 . . . no one other 
than Nixon might have been Nixon.” (Kripke, 1972, p. 48). To Kripke, identity is not the relation 
between an object and itself but is the relation that holds between two names when they designate 
the same object (Kripke, 1972, p. 108). So, when the identity statement between two names is true, 
it is necessarily true, even if we do not know it a-priori. However, as Kripke states, there is a 
confusion between what we can know a-priori and what is necessary.  
Kripke’s further example -using the Queen- explains that one would say that the Queen (as in the 
specific person) must be born of royal blood- however if in actuality the royal blood is a synthetic 
construction and she was born of different parents but later adopted by the royal family, then the 
anti-essentialists would have upper-hand as it would be a demonstration that it isn’t truly essential 
for the Queen to be of royal blood. However, at some point it seems as though such a claim is rather 
extreme. The essentialist would state that we cannot imagine that the individual who we call the 
Queen not having the property of being human. If the anti-essentialist admits that it is logically 
inconceivable that the Queen could ever have had the property of being a bird, for example, then 
they would be admitting that she has at least one necessary and internal property. They could say 
that it's only a contingent fact that the Queen is human, but this is truly difficult to accept. Can we 
really consider it as conceivable that she may never have actually been human (Kripke, 1972, p. 
108)?  
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Let's suppose that the Queen came from different parents- the sources of the biological sperm and 
egg, can we imagine a situation in which the Queen in fact, came from another, regular suburban 
couple? How could it be possible that a woman originating from an entirely different biological 
background could be the exact same person who rules England today? Kripke says that to him, 
anything coming from different origins is not the same object (Kripke, 1972, p. 114) so, if the Queen 
had come from any different parents, she would not be the same person.  
If we consider a table, for example, we may not know where the wood for the table came from, yet 
could this table have been made entirely from a different block of wood or even water hardened 
into ice from the Thames (Kripke, 1972, p. 115)? We cannot imagine this table being made of 
anything else, but we can perhaps imagine a replica of the table in a different material but placed in 
the same location. So, although the replication of the table may look identical, it will remain 
irreversibly a replica rather than the same as the original table. So then, to return to my endeavour 
topic of Gender we could suggest that, seeing as our sex is a result of the biological construction, 
that it is a necessary part of our existence- thus then the point would be that the man who has a sex 
change is still a man, because being a man is part of his essential origin.  
   
Possible Conclusions  
  
  
If we agree with Aristotle in saying that the essence of an entity lies within its functionality, then we 
are left with two options; either that gender contributes to our function or it is a separate 
fundament of our construction. Now, on one hand (as I discussed earlier) our gender is indicative of 
our behaviour, partly because our biological hormones affect our psychology but perhaps more 
importantly because society expects certain behaviours from certain genders. Aristotle’s  
Complementarity Theory” (Matthews, p.18, 1990) is evidence (if one chose to adhere to it) that the 
two sexes conform to certain gendered behaviours, in order to, create a harmonious equilibrium 
within society. Therefore, in other words, gender can be seen as functional as it allows us to 
contribute and exist within our society. On the other hand, in our more modern society, the 
definition between the genders has substantially blurred. When Aristotle established his 
Complementarity Theory, women filled more subservient, domestic roles and men had stronger 
dominant roles and there was very little- if any- deviance from this. Today, in a society that is 
endorsing and supporting the notion of being “gender binary”, homosexual couples are raising 
children away from stereotypical paternal and maternal roles yet efficiently raising confident, 
successful children. Women are undertaking occupations that for years have been limited to men 
and vice versa which is surely evidential that we do not need to submit to escribed gendered ideals 
to live successfully. In other words, gender may not necessarily contribute to our function and thus, 
according to Aristotle, not an essence. So, to refer back to my original endeavour, whether or not we 
would be the same person if we had a different gender, according to this gender seems to be what 
we would classify as a “type one” change- i.e. something that can change about an entity without 
altering its identity or existence.  
Sociology has played a key part in our quest to understand gender thus far and it is ever- present 
when we review Lockean essentialism. Locke states that “everything contained in that idea (nominal 
essence) is essential to that sort,"(Locke,1690, p.229) therefore what we need to establish is 
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whether or not gender can be included within what we call the nominal essence. Feminists seem to 
favour Lockean essentialism over the Aristotelian perspective. Whereas Aristotle’s essentialism is 
focused around species forms that are both essential to individuals and the basis for their kind 
membership (Witt, p.25,2011). The Lockean theory, on the other hand, suggests that the nominal 
essence, is in fact, an abstract, general idea, which is used to classify people. Of course, there are, 
numerous feasible classification methods, and our minds are actively engaged in forming the 
abstract general ideas that we use to categorize particulars (Witt, p.26,2011). Lockean theories of 
nominal essence are, instead, a theory of kind essentialism that does not posit any form or feature 
of the individual that is both essential to it and the basis for its kind membership. Therefore, unlike 
Aristotelian theories, people are not classified by their biological sexes nor their accompanying 
gender. Hence, Locke provides the theoretical framework for those feminists who are gender 
nominalists (Witt, p.26,2011). If we are to accept this then we are saying that if we alter the nominal 
essence then yes, the entity will change, however, gender is not part of said essence as Locke does 
not classify individuals for membership by specific traits. Without the traits of sexual organs or 
hormones, how could we even establish gender?  
Since Quine rejects analytic truths, then our idea of gender is skewed. By rejecting analytic truths, 
Quine is suggesting that if it is not analytically true that a man has a certain physical form, then it 
cannot be necessary that he has to have a specific body. In this sense, gender must not be assigned 
to us by our biological form. This highlights further that gender is a behaviour rather than a 
biological construct. If gender is not necessary to our identity, then feasibly we could change gender 
without altering who we are. For Quine, we can be neither essentially male nor essentially female – 
because we are not essentially anything at all.  
Kripke’s origin essentialism actually raises a completely opposing point. As Kripke believed that if 
anything about an entity’s origin changed then it would no longer be the same entity. If we do 
believe that gender is related to our biological construction then it is assigned at birth, so part of our 
origin is indeed our gender. Strictly speaking, Kripke is only committed to our sex being essential to 
us, but this would be a natural way to extend this view. So, in review of our position to the 
essentialist and anti-essentialist debate; if we are going to advocate the position of the essentialist 
then we can, on one hand, say that gender is an essential part of our makeup suggesting that, if our 
gender changed then we would be identifiable as a different person. Secondly, one might say that 
although there are indeed essential properties within our identities, however, our gender is not part 
of this. Thirdly, following a Lockean view, we might say that our nominal essence can change, so 
gender might have once been part of it even if it no longer is. On the other hand, an anti-essentialist 
might agree with that latter point that as there is no essence, Gender does not impact on our 
construction of identity, as nothing is essential. However, it is plausible for an anti- essentialist to 
believe that if our gender changes we are not the same person, not because gender is essential but 
because our specific gender is what impacts and influences social behaviours.  
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The Heterosexual Matrix  
  
  
  
If Gender is considered to be an influencing factor within our existence, then we need to establish in 
what way we are indeed affected by the existence of Gender. According to Judith Butler, “sexuality is 
what leads us to Gender and our Gender leads to our desires,” (Butler, 2007, p. 23). These 
relationships are created by the mechanism known as the “Heterosexual Matrix”. Butler argues that 
Gender affects the validity of our lives in the sense that to be recognised for having legitimacy and 
value or in other words to live a “liveable life”, individuals must not deviate from the norms created 
within the Heterosexual Matrix (Butler, 2007, p. 27). When someone deviates from these norms, 
they begin to be considered as unintelligible and in other words, not a viable subject. This is what 
reinforces the Heterosexual Matrix. Therefore, to be considered as an intelligible individual and 
furthermore accepted within society, we must adhere to the norms stipulated and created within 
the matrix (White, 2015, p. 318).  
   
If we apply this mechanism to our discussion of the importance of Gender within our identity, we 
arrive at Butler’s conception of Gender Performativity. According to this, gender is the result of 
reiterated acting which consequently results in the production of normal or static Genders. The 
repeated behaviour associated with one gender is often the antithesis of the behaviour displayed by 
the other Gender. True Gender then becomes “a narrative sustained by the collective commitment 
to perform, sustain and produce polar and discrete genders as cultural fiction and then punishments 
for not adhering to said fictions” (White, 2015, p. 318). Therefore, if Gender is something we act as 
or perform as, then equally it is something we can also not act as. If this is true, then Gender is not 
essential to us in the sense that it is something we can both be and not be.  
We are, of course, not talking about our biological sex, but instead about our Gender, the 
masculinities or femininities that we express in our actions and behaviours. Judith Butler argues that, 
however, there is no sex that isn’t gendered-all bodies are gendered at the beginning of their social 
existence… and there is no existence which isn’t social (Butler, 2007, p. 34). This then means there 
isn’t a natural body that exists before social inscription. Conclusively then, there is no “I”, no identity 
that exists separately or even before Gender performativity begins (Butler, 2007, p. 35). This brings 
us back to the idea of origin essentialism- Kripke says that to him, anything coming from different 
origins is not the same object (Kripke, 1980, p. 114). So, if from the moment we begin to exist we are 
ascribed a gender then the gender we act as, or are treated as, becomes part of our origins, and as 
Kripke says if something from our origins changed then we would not be the same- so in this sense 
our gender is essential.  
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The concept of gender  
  
  
“One is not born, but rather becomes a woman” (Simone De Beauvoir 1949), in this quote the 
suggestion is that one is not born as a woman, but it is something one becomes through time and 
development. In addition, she is also suggesting that the possession of male or female biological 
parts, is what influences the way we are treated by others, which is what establishes the difference 
between what it is to be a woman, and what it is to be a man. If this is true, then we cannot say 
gender is essential, for as previously mentioned a property is not essential if it something that we 
could feasibly be, or not be. For, if a woman is something, we can become there must logically also 
be the possibility that we do not become a woman but instead develop into something else- a man 
perhaps? Beauvoir further claims that a ‘woman' is a historical concept and not a natural fact, she 
clearly highlights the differentiation of the distinction between sex, as biological facticity, and then  
gender, as the cultural interpretation or signification of that facticity (Butler, 1988, p. 522). Reflecting 
upon the famous quotation about one’s development into womanhood, one must wonder whether 
or not this also applies to men-is a man something you also become or is it somehow different and is 
instead something you are born as? De Beauvoir refers to women as the “Second sex” referring to 
the fact that the man is regarded as the standard, whereas the woman is seen as a deviation from 
this standard. If there are only two sexes, men and women, does this mean that before becoming a 
woman, we are men?  
  
Another interpretation of De Beauvoir’s famous quote could, in fact, reflects her idea that patriarchy 
was created to cause the progression of men which leads to the oppression of women- in other 
words, it is suggested that the very notion of the term “woman” was designed by men, for their own 
economic and social gain (Joseph, 2008).  Stereotypically, women have been given the submissive, 
passive role throughout society’s development which has conditioned women to step back and allow 
men to be dominating and uphold all of the leadership roles.  In relation to her idea that “One is not 
born, but rather becomes a woman” (Simone De Beauvoir 1949) De Beauvoir highlights the idea that 
being biologically female isn’t what causes the social “handicap”, it is instead that ideas attached to 
the notion of being a woman that causes the restriction and oppression: “the development of 
female sex organs, menstruation, pregnancy, menopause – have a meaning in themselves; but in a 
hostile or oppressive society they can come to take on the meaning of being a burden and 
disadvantage, as women come to accept the meanings a patriarchal society accords them,” (Joseph, 
2008). In other words, the biological attributes of womanhood are not, in themselves oppressive, it 
is their perception that becomes this issue. This could go some way to explain why, and how, 
womanhood can be seen completely differently in different cultures across the globe.  In this sense, 
we could also perceive De Beauvoir’s quote to be in reference to the sociological role of being a 
woman – so, an individual is made into a woman by experiencing oppression and subservience, 
rather than their status of “womanhood” being directly correlated to their biological construction at 
birth. Of course, if this is the case, and womanhood is something we are labelled as, rather than 
something we are born into, it means that it is not an essential part of our identity, but part of our 
social existence.   
As Butler theorized, we are not born with a gender, but it is actually something that we develop over 
time. Here we can see the divide between Sex and Gender appear again, Sex is the correct term 
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when referring to our chromosomes, reproductive organs and hormones, for example, when a baby 
is born, we classify their sex by their genitals, whereas Gender is created and developed throughout 
life through our social interactions and life choices. If gender is something that develops throughout 
time and is not related to our biological construction, then does this mean that a person with a 
female’s body could develop a masculine gender? Fundamentally, this is possible, our identification 
of the gender/sex distinction indicates that the only way in which gender develops is through 
behaviour, therefore, we could just act as a different gender, rather than as the one directly linked 
to our biological sex- i.e. woman and femininity. Yet, does this mean that our biological construction 
does not influence our gender?  
It would be contrary to evidence to suggest that biology does not, in some ways, affect both the 
gender and the personality that we develop. For example, part of what it means to be a woman, or a 
man is to be recognized to have a certain kind of body that is linked to certain biological processes 
like reproduction (Witt, 2011, p. 35). Sex undoubtedly highlights a difference between men and 
women, Shaywitz et al used MRI Scans to examine the brain whilst women and men carried out 
language tasks; the results showed that on average, women used their right hemispheres whilst men 
used the left. Furthermore, the increased levels of testosterone in males cause the brain 
hemispheres to work more independently than in women’s brains (Shaywitz, 1995, p. 608).  
  
  
Functionalism  
  
  
It is important to understand how and why gender became culturally structured. There are many 
social theories about how gender was formed, but I intend to start with functionalism.  
Functionalism, also named “structural functionalism,” is a macro-sociological theory that is based on 
the idea that society is constructed of interdependent parts, each of which contributes to the 
functioning of the whole society. Functionalists aim to recognise the fundamental elements to 
determine the functions that each part fulfils in meeting basic social needs in predictable ways. 
Functionalists question how any single element of the social structure contributes to overall social 
stability, balance, and equilibrium. Furthermore, they assert that in the face of disruptive social 
change, society can be restored to equilibrium as long as built-in mechanisms of social control 
operate effectively and efficiently. Social control and stability are enhanced when people share 
beliefs and values in common. Functionalist emphasis on this value consensus is a major component 
in virtually all of their interpretations related to social change. The central values surrounding gender 
roles, marriage, and the family are most important to functionalist theory regarding social 
equilibrium.  
In relation to the concepts of gender, functionalists suggest that in pre-industrial societies the social 
equilibrium was maintained by assigning different tasks to men and women. The differences 
between genders became key in determining who became responsible for which tasks. It was 
functional for women—more limited by biological requirements such as pregnancy, childbirth, and 
nursing—to be assigned domestic roles closer to home as caretakers of children and households. So 
then, it fell on the shoulders of the men to hunt and collect supplies and such endeavours meant 
that the men would need to be away from home for extended periods of time. Children were 
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needed to help with agricultural and domestic activities. Girls would continue these more 
domesticated activities as they grew older whereas boys were allowed to hunt with the older males 
when they grew older; so, in this sense, from a very early age, children were divided by their 
biological sex which reinforces the differences between genders. Once this pattern became the 
norm, it was a structure that became replicated throughout cultures and inevitably throughout the 
world.  
  
  
  
Gender temporality  
  
  
  
Although we can see that gender was formed through cultural needs, now we have moved into the 
digital age and there is no need for men to be away for weeks hunting for supplies, we now need to 
understand how these gender ideals match with new social needs. That gender is a social construct 
becomes especially apparent when one compares how men and women behave across various 
different cultures in this day and age, and how in some cultures and societies, other genders exist 
too. Today, in Western industrialized nations like the U.S, people tend to think of masculinity and 
femininity in dichotomous terms, viewing men and women as distinctly different. Other cultures, 
however, challenge this assumption and have less distinct views of masculinity and femininity. For 
example, historically there was a category of people in the Navajo culture called Berdaches, who 
were anatomically men but who were defined as a third gender considered to fall between male and 
female. Berdaches married other men (not Berdaches), although neither was considered 
homosexual, as they would be in today’s Western culture.  
Functionalist thinkers still feel that these gender roles, although with different foundations, are still 
omnipresent within the average family setup. Parson and Bales stated that family life is far more 
harmonious and successful when traditional gender roles are enforced and regarded. When the 
male undergoes the “Key role” (or what is known as the instrumental role), he is expected to uphold 
the physical integrity of the family by being the provider of food and shelter and linking the family to 
the outside world (Bales, 1998, p. 95). When the female adapts the “Expressive role”, she is 
expected to maintain relationships and provide emotional support and nurture that ensures the 
whole household runs successfully. If we deviate too far from these more traditional roles, or where 
there is merging of the two roles, the family system is unbalanced and that can threaten the survival 
of the family unit. Advocates of functionalist assumptions argue, for instance, that gender role 
ambiguity regarding instrumental and expressive roles is a major factor in divorce. Once again, we 
conclude that gender roles are not innate to the individual, but expectations imposed upon 
individuals by the demands of a developing society. The functionalist theory highlights that in terms 
of gender being part of our identity, it is not about who we are intrinsically but what we are deemed 
as extrinsically. What is integral to us, is the part of us that must remain consistent throughout 
eternity. However, if we are to condone the functionalist perspective then we are admitting that our 
gender is dependent on the culture we inhabit. We then must question, if we inhabited a different 
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culture or lived in a different time, whether our gender would change? Well according to this theory 
then yes, it would indeed.  
  
  
  
  
Essence and accident  
  
  
Hypermasculinity (for example) is the idea that men are permitted characteristics such as lust to 
present sexual prowess, rage to show off strength, and bravado to display courage in place of 
feminine behaviours such as emotion, compassion and weakness. The male role as the provider and 
protector of the family has become more and more obsolete, as the gender roles have started to 
equalize. To live in an ever changing and complex society, such as the post-modern world, means 
that men have difficulty finding their role and masculine identity (Hansen, 2012, p. 1). Sociological 
studies have shown that in the modern era, where men are no longer the sole-earners and jobs have 
become less physically demanding and have been replaced by “softer” office jobs (Hansen, 2012, p. 
4). This has led to a large percentage of males over exaggerating stereotypical masculine behaviours 
in order to compensate for being unable to adhere to pre-existing social expectations. In this 
instance we can see how the gender of masculinity can be manipulated and changed depending on 
the needs of the culture. If this is true, then this is further evidence of how gender is a cultural 
construction, one that is either consciously or subconsciously performed by an individual to meet 
pre-perceived ideals. Furthermore, it demonstrates the functionalist perspective that gender has 
and will keep continuing to change throughout time, it is not a fixed or static entity.  
Yet on the other hand, other psychological studies have shown that the increased levels of 
testosterone in men as opposed to women increase aggressive behaviours. Anecdotal and early 
correlational evidence suggests that higher levels of circulating testosterone in men are associated 
with increases in male stereotypical behaviours, such as physical aggression and anger, which would 
explain the gendered perception that men are more aggressive than women. We could, from this 
information, suggest that therefore gender is essential to us because the traits of the masculine 
gender are, in fact, birthed from the biological repercussions of being a man and our sex is our 
origin. However, if we look back at Aristotle’s distinction between essence and accidents it does give 
a new version to the query. The change and diversity of the behaviours by people can be, in one 
way, explained by the differentiation between hormones and biology or we could also think that 
such traits are, in fact, accidents to our existence rather than essential. It would be reduction of the 
facts to assign emotions to the root of a person’s identity. Behaviour and emotions are sporadic, 
they can be triggered by spontaneous events and result in spontaneous actions. In today’s society, 
people often attend therapy or counselling to try and change damaging or unhealthy behaviour to 
the conclusion of not changing one’s essence but changing one’s personality. In addition, people’s 
behaviour can change on a daily basis, with so many variables like diet, sleep, medication or even 
just general life experiences and it would be ludicrous to say that we change our essence every day 
would it not? So, this leads to the idea that behaviour is an accidental feature of our existence, 
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rather than an essential characteristic, and so if, as formerly discussed, we conclude that gender is a 
behaviour then gender too is an accident rather than essential.  
  
  
  
  
Gender essentialism  
  
  
The idea of gender temporality, dependent on culture, time and experience is one that is also 
verified by Judith Butler’s idea of gender. Butler opposes an essentialist view on gender and the 
sexed body, arguing that the appearance of an ontological status of gender is nothing but the 
outcome of a series of regulatory practices that, through their sedimentation, conceal their genesis. 
Gender is therefore socially constructed, and this construction makes the body socially visible, as it is 
only through the mediation of this series of social practices that the body becomes gendered at all 
(Arruzza, 2015, p. 34). Butler views gender as – “an identity instituted through a stylized repetition of 
acts. Furthermore, gender is instituted through the stylization of the body and, hence, must be 
understood as the mundane way in which bodily gestures, movements, and enactments of various 
kinds constitute the illusion of an abiding gendered self,”. In other words, gender as an identity is the 
conformity of the body and thus so is more similar to any biological, physiological process, or act, 
that every person does every day.  
My first query is whether or not, if our gender changed, we could be seen as the same person. If 
gender is constantly fluctuating and changing anyway then really the question answers itself. Butler 
also goes on to specify how gender isn’t able to be essential “‘Because there is neither an “essence” 
that gender expresses or externalizes nor an objective ideal to which gender aspires, and because 
gender is not a fact, the various acts of gender create the idea of gender, and without those acts, 
there would be no gender at all”. Butler is specifying that as Gender is not actually a thing, or a fact, 
its existence relies on the acts that we class as gender specific, for without it there is no gender to 
exist (Arruzza, 2015, p. 32). As gendered roles and behaviours can change -and we can see in our 
history that this is true- and so cannot be essences, by definition. One might, also, suggest that 
gender is a process of social interaction and development and so, as a process, gender cannot be 
defined as a substance and it is only substances that could have an essence.  
Furthermore, it is also integral to the construction of a person that not only is there a divide 
between sex and gender but also between psychological and social properties. Importantly, we must 
recognise that people are essentially those beings capable of self-consciousness or the first-person 
perspective. Such capacities are intrinsic, psychological properties of people. These traits are what is 
recognisable, or identifiable about a person. John Hick’s position on the replica theory also 
reinforces this; he poses that if John Smith was currently in America, suddenly disappears, and a 
replica of him suddenly appears in India. His friends and colleagues, sceptically, carry out a series of 
tests from talking to this individual to gather whether or not this new John Smith is the same person 
who was originally in America. According to Hick the replica has “continuity of memory, complete 
similarity of bodily features including fingerprints, emotions and mental dispositions” ((Hick, 1990, p. 
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47). Hick’s idea was that once all the similarity tests prove positive, Smith’s friends would have no 
choice but to accept the replication as the actual John Smith, because there is technically, no 
difference between the two. However, there would indeed be a difference between the replica and 
the individual who appeared in India, perhaps not to the friends and family but to the original person 
there would be a great change, for regardless of the fact there is a new replica of himself in another 
country, the original Mr. Smith experienced what it was like to disappear! It needs to be said, 
however, that to see this you must adapt a subjective viewpoint, rather than objective.  
It could be said that what is essential to us, is what is recognizable, or is the elements of us that 
makes us individuals. Our personalities and memories or even our likes and dislikes. Yet, couldn’t it 
also be said that we are actually recognized by our physicality? Yes, of course we are somewhat 
identifiable by the memories we uphold, but if someone were to suffer from amnesia, we would not 
cease to recognise them without their memories, because we could still recognise them by their 
appearance. A large part of our social existence is our face and our physical form- our passports, 
driver’s licenses and even social media profiles all display pictures of ourselves to allow us to be 
recognised by those trying to find or identify us. If a child goes missing, we issue a picture of their 
face because that is, truly, the fastest way of being identified by others. Although our identities may 
somewhat lie in our memories and beliefs, we would be much harder to identify with a different 
face and body. But as we have already understood, gender is a social position, and to have a gender 
is to occupy a social position; persons, by definition, are not the kind of individuals that could be 
essentially gendered (Witt, 2011, p. 65). In addition, as I have just outlined, the first-person 
perspective of self is incredibly important to our identity, as this is what forms the perceptions and 
actually experiences sensations that go on to form and influence our lives, however this individual 
perspective is understood and verified only by ourselves so, as a result, does not need to be 
gendered- your flow of consciousness does not have to contained essentially gendered thoughts, 
because you can change them. As gender is a behaviour, it is best understood as a social role and 
seeing as our perspective is individual and not social, then our perspective is not gendered. So 
regardless of whether or not you view identity from the first-person perspective- as Descartes did- 
or from the third person perspective- as Hicks did- it still cannot, essentially, be gendered.  
  
  
Mega-social role  
  
  
If we are to say, then that gender is a behavioural pattern and not part of our biological makeup 
then one must consider where the desire for such behaviour is born from. This refers again to 
Aristotelian thinking. When Aristotle asked what human flourishing is, he considered lives that are 
based upon endless different types of activities and pursuits. For example, there is materialistic 
existence based around money or, there is a spiritual existence based around the teachings of a 
religion or cult. There could also be pursuing the life of virtuous activities. All of these different types 
of lives are aiming towards desirable goods, yet they have different aims and focus. If we are able to 
recognize multiple ways of living with their corresponding goods, how can we order our society? 
(Witt, 2011, p. 91) Just as being a doctor or being a mother is a way of living, and both of these ways 
of living are normatively interconnected. How are we definable if we occupy two different social 
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positions? For example, which are we responsive to or does it, in fact, mean we are evaluable under 
both social roles (Witt,2011, p.89)? It is well known that Aristotle believed in the fulfilment of 
virtuous activity as the purpose of human and “so that our good, which is human flourishing, must 
lie in that activity” (Witt, 2011, p. 89). Now, Aristotle’s famous metaphor of the target might suggest 
that he thinks of human flourishing as a consequence of virtuous activity. However, Aristotle doesn’t 
think that virtuous activity directly results in happiness any more than happiness is a direct 
consequence of virtuous activity. Instead, Aristotle said that a life of virtuous activity is just a life of 
human flourishing; virtuous activity is the dominant element in a flourishing human life because it is 
both prior to, and prioritises, all of the other activities (Witt, 2011, p.90). It could be said that, in fact, 
virtuous activity is the principle of normative unity within Aristotelian ethics as it what organises the 
flourishing human life. The pursuit of pleasure and money making are “not excluded from a 
flourishing human life, but their part in it, and indeed, what counts as appropriate pleasure and 
money making, are both determined by the dominant element, which is virtuous activity” (Witt, 
2011, p.90). So then, pleasures are part of a virtuous life if they are moderate and any methods of 
making money must be done in accordance with generosity and kindness. In this way, the mega 
social role is the dominant normative element in our current society — for it is what organises and 
influences all of our different social roles.  
So, to identify the mega social role, we are looking for an element within everyone’s life that 
influences and effects our behaviours and decisions. For example, “An academic performs a series of 
tasks: lecturer, grader, advisor, collaborator, teacher, writer, and colleague. Each of these functions 
is normatively inflected by the overarching social role of being an academic” (Witt, 2011, p. 79). 
Now, for as much as our occupation is a vitally important influencing factor in our life, not everyone 
is employed for their whole lives, but these still must have an underlying, rooted reason to exist 
during their unemployment, meaning careers must not be the mega social role. A second 
characteristic of the mega social role is that it should plausibly inflect or define a broad range of 
other social roles. An individual might be a collector or a hunter without greatly altering his or her 
other social roles. Intuitively, we are not inclined to say that someone who gives up hunting is no 
longer the same social individual. Gender is an example of a social role that is capable of satisfying 
both of these characteristics. Gender usually lifelong social position. Members of the Transgender 
community can be seen as the antithesis to this claim, as they at some point in their lives change 
their gender, meaning they haven’t had a lifelong gender role. Considering this, how could gender 
still be a lifelong social role and also a candidate for the mega social role? (Witt, 2011, p. 80) From 
being responsive to one set of gendered social norms and expectations, appearance and posture the 
transgendered individual becomes answerable to an entirely new set of gendered social norms. 
Indeed, we can find in the experience of transgendered individuals a “moving articulation of the 
centrality of gender in our lives, and the ways in which it inflects our other social roles “(Boylan, 
2003, p. 87). Also, it could be said that the Transgender community has a unique perspective upon 
the role of gender and that they way gender impacts and influences their lives is very different from 
the way gender impacts the lives of the non-transgender community.  
Charlotte Witt’s suggestion is that gender does unify our actions and our social roles. Whatever 
gender you associate with, in any way, impacts on the decisions that are made by you and also for 
you, as Judith Butler’s “Heterosexual Matrix” demonstrates. Although, as a social role, gender is not 
an innate entity within us, it is also on a different spectrum than other social roles. As the decider 
and derivative of other social engagements and roles it is undoubtedly a dominating social position 
(Witt, 2011, p. 80). Furthermore, Gender as a mega social role prioritizes the other social roles 
associated with social positions that an individual occupies, in order to unify them into a coherent 
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whole (Witt, 2011, p. 81). So, our earlier example of an individual who is both a mother and also 
works as a doctor, does not need to decide which role she identifies with, because her role as a 
woman unifies all the roles she fulfils and the roles she will go on to uphold. One aspect of the 
prioritising done by the mega social role is definitional; the definitions of other social roles are 
determined or influenced by the mega social role (Witt, 2011, p.82). The specific gender of any 
individual also decides which other positions said individual may undertake, for example a man 
cannot be a mother as a mother cannot be a man- “Gender is both a synchronic and a diachronic 
principle of normative unity for social individuals” (Witt, 2011, p. 91). This suggests, that gender is a 
vitally important part of the lives every individual leads, influencing not only the decisions we make 
but also the way in which we lead our lives- as such an important role, gender is undoubtedly an 
influential factor but as a social role, gender is not an essential element of our personal identity but 
is, instead, an integral part of our social identity.  
On one hand, society does have essential gender-specific roles which breed specified gendered 
behaviours. Being born as a daughter or a son are terms given to us in reflection of our biological sex 
(as opposed to our gender) but such terms denote behaviours. If the social world consisted only of 
gender specified social positions, then it would be relatively obvious to establish gender as a mega 
social role that provides a principle of normative unity for social individuals (Witt, 2011, p. 93). In 
this scenario, every social position that we uphold would have a gender-specific definition and 
gender-specific norms, and the way in which gender is interwoven throughout our lives and unifies 
our social existence would be apparent and uncontroversial (Witt, 2011, p.94).  
Yet on the other hand, some societies have, or had, a fairly strict division of social positions between 
women and men, and for these societies it is uncontroversial that gender is a principle of normative 
unity for social individuals. Even in societies with less rigid gender divisions, many social positions 
are reserved for men and others for women, and their norms reflect this gender separation. In these 
societies, it is easy to agree that gender is a principle of normative unity even though some 
individuals might choose to deviate away from their societies’ norms, or might have a different, 
ungendered self-view. However, there are also societies like our own in which many social positions 
do not have gender-specific definitions. Yet, in societies such as ours, that are so heavily guided by 
gender related expectations and considering gender as a mega social role explains why many social 
positions have gendered norms, even if they are not specifically defined in relation to gender (Witt, 
2011, p. 98).  
  
  
Uniessential Gendering  
  
  
  
Witt’s theory of Uniessentialism is based upon an Aristotelian concept considering the unification of 
an entity’s functionalities (Witt,2011, p.15) so, in other words “Uniessentialism explains why an 
individual exists rather than a heap of materials” (Witt,2011, p.15). Witt illustrates the purpose of 
Uniessentialism by discussing the image of a collection of building materials and then asking us, what 
makes these raw materials a house? The answer, as I established earlier in this thesis, is its 
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functionality. Furthermore, for Aristotle, the essence of something is the cause of being of the 
individual whose essence it is. In relation to gender, a social individual undertakes and fulfils a vast 
amount of social positions diachronically – one man can be a son, a brother, an academic and a 
father all at the same time- and if we accept gender as the mega-social role then it is gender which 
unifies these positions so then gender is what is Uniessential to an individual.  
According to Witt’s theory of gender uniessentialism, the essential property of an individual is only 
essential in relation to the organisation of human societies, which is also contingent. Within the fact 
of the real structuring of societies the concept of being either a man or a woman is Uniessential, to 
social individuals. However, there may possibly be societies, maybe even our own, whereby the 
necessary social function of engendering is a task for robots, or by cloning rather than by 
uniessentially gendered social individuals (Witt, 2011, p. 104). This idea actually demonstrates both 
the contingent nature of our social construction and also the relational nature of uniessential 
properties. Gender is only uniessential in relation to the structure of society, or in other words the 
demand for gendered social behaviours- and of course the structure of our societies is a contingent 
creation, one that could and may likely change in the near future. The earlier discussion of 
hypermasculinity in my thesis is further evidence that needs and demands of uniessential genders 
can develop with society as we head into a more technologically dependent culture. The current 
division between female and male social behaviours blurs the requirements of each gender, 
demonstrating further that gender is not a stand-alone entity but a reflection of the cultural 
structure of society-which is contingent.  
What is important to ask is whether or not relational properties can be deemed as essential? Well, it 
is undoubtable that what elements of an entity can class as essential is interchangeable and the 
context in which they are classed as essential is also dependent on the kind of individual. If we use 
the example of Artifacts, then they only have a relational essence, and such said relational 
properties are only essential within a social and historical context (Witt, 2011, p. 105), which is, of 
course, contingent. The discussion of Artifacts mirrors Aristotle’s house concept: just as a house has 
a relational essence; the purpose of acting as a shelter is also its functional essence and that is, in 
fact, a relational property. The functional property is only essential when in the context of society, 
we do reside in houses now but one day we may not and it is not necessary that we in fact build 
houses as shelter when there are other alternatives, so a houses functional property is also a 
relational property. To conclude, the contingent element is that there indeed exists a social world 
that needs and uses houses as a shelter solution; but in relation to the actual entity of the “house” in 
the social world, the function of the house is uniessential to it. It could be said that the social world 
which uses the category of gender, is also contingent. Yet, in this world, individuals are actually 
unified by the classifications of their genders and, thus, uniessentially gendered. Maybe in a 
different social world engendering may be forgotten in favour of cloning and in that “cloning” world, 
social individuals would have a hugely different principle of normative unity (Witt, 2011, p. 106).  
If we take a moment to actually consider the repercussions of Witt’s “cloning” world, the results are 
interesting.  Is the existence of social individuals with only necessary properties actually feasible? It 
is true that Social individuals cannot exist without some sort of principle of normative unity? Yet this 
does not highlight a specific principle of normative unity. This means then that although, as 
individuals, we do need a principle of normative unity it does not mean that each society has the 
same necessary normative principle. This is very reflective of the world we live in, as throughout the 
world, societies are structured differently depending on how the people live and what the people 
need to do to survive, meaning then that whatever principle unifies the people depends on the 
social context. If then, for example, this “cloning” world or indeed any other world, ceased to focus 
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its organisation around gender then gender would cease to be Uniessential. According to Witt, we 
need a principle of normative unity to combine and unite the many social positions undertaken by 
one person, so in a scenario where gender doesn’t exist, according to Witt, there would need to be 
another principle of normative unity that replaced it. So even in a cloning world there would need to 
be another construction to organise the social roles of people. Therefore, if gender is the normative 
unity of us, then if we changed genders there would be no impact upon our identity and even if we 
lost our gender completely, in some hypothetical scenario, then we would have to find something to 
replace it with in order to define our social roles, but it would not mean that we were no longer the 
same person.  
Witt’s theory of gender Uniessentialism demonstrates that gender, as undoubtedly vital as it is, is 
only so vital in our specific society. Gender is an elective importance rather than an essential 
importance. In this way we cannot argue that gender is reason behind many of our decisions and 
behaviours, but it is not an innate, primitive drive- just a compound of social conformity and social 
necessity. If we had been born in another place at another time then gender may not have existed 
so cannot be essential to our personal identity, just essential to our current social existence, i.e. 
relatively essential, so ultimately contingent.  
  
  
  
Locke’s Psychological Continuity  
  
  
If we are to say, hypothetically, that if we suddenly changed genders, we would remain the same 
person then we would first need to establish what we mean by “person”. So far, we have discussed 
the possibility of gender as a social expectation and as a repeated behaviour but what we haven’t 
yet narrowed down is the relationship between the existence of gender (whatever form it takes) and 
the existence of one’s own identity. This problem mirrors the philosophical dilemma of personal 
identity, so this is where I shall begin.  
There is a plethora of responses to the solve the personal identity problem, which is that of 
specifying the criteria of identity for a person: what makes something count as the same person 
across time. I shall begin by discussing the approach of psychological continuity as discussed by John 
Locke. Locke’s theory explains identity as being continued by the continuation of the individual 
consciousness rather than by explaining it in relation to an immaterial soul. Furthermore, John Locke 
states that in order to understand personal identity, we first need to understand what a person is 
(Mackie, 1976, p. 174) and Locke’s answer is to conclude that “a thinking intelligent being that has 
reason and reflection and can consider itself, as its self, the same thinking in different times and 
places,” (Locke, 1690/ 1996, p. 27). He is greatly concerned with the definition of the word ‘person’ 
which is used so frequently in colloquial conversation- is it used as a noun or is it used as some form 
of identity classification? Ultimately, he answers that consciousness is that which constitutes as 
personal identity, “that makes me, for example, the same me, the same person, through and despite 
the passage of time” (Mackie, 1976, p. 176). Already we can see that (according to Locke) to be 
classed as the same person even with a different gender, we need to have the same continued 
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consciousness. This seems a fairly logical and simple solution when we discuss changing genders, we 
do not conjure images of in some way having our consciousness reset just our gender altered.  
As Descartes also suggested, Locke states that consciousness and thinking are inseparable. in other 
words, Locke is suggesting that when we plan, consider or think we have full awareness that we are 
doing so and so, using this consciousness we can each consider ourselves as ourselves or basically, as 
a thinking individual. This principle further explains the idea that any perceptions or sensations we 
may encounter, belong to the self. In addition, when Locke said that “as far as this consciousness can 
be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that person” 
(Locke, 1690/ 1996, p.27) he means that we remain the same person as last week, or 30 years ago in 
virtue of the fact that we still remember what we did at that time (Lowe, 1995, p. 105). So then, if 
we consider the hypothetical individual who had a spontaneous gender swap was previously of 
feminine gender who woke up tomorrow morning as a man, she would likely question (and 
probably, most importantly, be rather alarmed) by the sudden change in their form. The fact that 
their conscious thought would be so responsive to the change demonstrates that regardless of the 
physical vessel, the consciousness is a continued individual awareness of self that responds and 
reacts to stimulus. The very fact that our subject would be shocked by their physical transformation 
shows that there is no discontinuity in their consciousness throughout their transformation – our 
subject expected to awake with their familiar, feminine perceptions and instead wakes with a new, 
masculine influence and their self/consciousness reacts to this with surprise and most likely shock- 
two very normal reactions given the circumstances but if the consciousness was in some way altered 
or disturbed during the spontaneous gender change then the subject would not be alarmed as their 
conscious self would have an expectation of a changed masculine perception upon awakening, 
rather than the original feminine perspective. So then, if we adhere to the Lockean theory we are 
suggesting that gender does not impact upon personal identity as it is not an element of our 
consciousness which constitutes our identity.  
Locke completely rejects the idea that personal identity could be constructed of our physical form.  
He states that there is undoubtedly difference between the construction of a person and of a man 
(meaning man in the biological sense) “ the same man consists…in nothing but participation in a 
continued life by constantly fleeting particles of matter, in succession vitally united to the same 
organized Body” (Locke, 1690/1996, p. 29) therefore the difference between man and person is that 
the man exists through the continuation of life, and the person is continued through the prolonged 
existence of the consciousness. So, if we go back again to our subject who has a sudden gender 
transformation, we would say that this is the ceasing existence of a woman and the beginning of a 
new life for a man- rather than the death and beginning of another person. Furthermore, Locke goes 
on to deny that having the same, persistent and immaterial soul makes you the same person. For 
example, if Socrates’ soul entered my body somehow but I could not recall any of his thoughts or 
memories, then I am not Socrates. Equally, it might be passed from one body to another: should the 
soul of a prince, carrying with it the consciousness of the Prince’s past life, enter and inform the 
body of a cobbler as soon as deserted by his own soul, everyone sees he would be the same person 
with the prince, accountable only for the prince’s actions (Locke,1690/1996, P.20). According to 
Locke, no one would suggest that this is the same man as the former prince. Therefore, if the person 
who wakes up in the body of an opposing gender and they as long as they can recall and remember 
their memories of childhood and family etc. then this is the same person, regardless of the very 
different physical form they now reside in.  
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 Criticism of Locke  
  
  
However, this is, in my opinion, one of the greatest weaknesses of Locke’s identity theory. There is 
nothing more fragile than one’s memory. What you can remember from one day to the next can 
depend on something as trivial as a bad day at work or lack of sleep. Just because I don’t remember 
a trip to the zoo when I was seven years old, doesn’t mean that I am not the same person today who 
went on that trip all those years ago. Seemingly, the inconsistencies are too strong, especially when 
one considers the possibility that I may well not remember a holiday I went on at age nine, but I 
might remember a birthday party from when I was the same age. These two events both involved 
the same nine-year-old child however it doesn’t seem logical that I am the child who had the party 
but not who went on the holiday – as the children at both events were the same person.  
Thomas Reid raised a very similar point. He too believed that relying on memory made Locke’s 
theory vulnerable to weakness, Reid introduced the “Officer paradox” to further highlight the flaws 
in Locke’s theory of personal identity. He asks us to “Suppose that as he was stealing the enemy’s 
standard (“standard” is their flag) a 40-year-old brave officer remembered stealing apples from a 
neighbour’s orchard when he was 10 years old; and then suppose further that when he was 80 years 
old, a retired general, he remembered stealing the enemy’s standard as a brave officer, but no 
longer remembered stealing the neighbour’s apples. On Locke’s account, the general would have to 
be both identical to the apple-stealer (because of the transitivity of the identity relation: he was 
identical to the brave officer, who himself was identical to the apple-stealer) and not identical to the 
apple- stealer (given that he had no direct memory of the boy’s experiences) (Nimbalkar, 2011,  
p.271)”. Therefore, Reid argues, that personal identity is more substantial, for as he says, “Identity … 
is the foundation of all rights and obligations, and of accountableness, and the notion of it is fixed 
and precise” (T. Reid, 1785, p. 117).  
However, we could approach such criticism with the Ancestral Animal argument which is the idea 
that if we are not (non-human) animals, then this must mean our parents were not animals and that 
their parents were not animals, and so on and so forth. In other words, by rejecting that we are 
animals, we reject that we ever descended from animals, which of course denies the ideas of 
evolution. Furthermore, by rejecting- as Reid suggested- that the boy who stole the apples is not the 
same person as the brave officer or the retired officer poses the same flawed thinking. The boy who 
stole the apple’s lived a life of experiences and sensations that resulted in him becoming a brave 
officer that, as his career developed, led him to be the retired general. To deny this happened 
because of a lack of memory is as absurd as rejecting that we ever came from animals because we 
no longer resemble them. The linear contingency of our ancestors exists regardless of our 
knowledge and to deny a stage in our ancestral history would lead to a gap in our history and our 
development, just as denying the general is the apple-stealer leads to us questioning how the 
general ever became a soldier in the first place, or who the soldier was before he became a soldier. 
The consciousness of the boy is still connected to the consciousness of the general, regardless of 
awareness and memory, just as we are related to our ancestors despite never knowing who they 
were or even what they were. There must be an ancestral connection within our identities, to 
explain how an unthinking foetus could become an apple stealing child who could later fight in a war 
as a soldier.  
28  
  
Moreover, as we have already discussed, gender is a very influential element of our lives. It has the 
potential to influence our entire lives, the way we are perceived and the opportunities we can 
experience. However, what needs to be understood, is that If gender is such a strong influencing 
factor in our lives, then what is the effect of changing genders on the individual’s consciousness? If 
we refer back to our subject if she remembers what it was like to be a woman and growing up as a 
little girl, developing through her life until getting her first job as a woman…but now, she has new 
memories and experiences of being a man and that is changing her consciousness. According to 
Locke, as the consciousness has continued- it doesn’t matter that the experiences and lifestyle of the 
individual will change so drastically- so the person remains the same. However, one could say that 
even without a change to the subject’s gender, her experiences and consciousness would have been 
very different as she grew up and developed – she would have gone from an innocent child playing 
with toys, to a woman with a job and a mortgage and maybe even children of her own. Yet, even 
though her sensations, and perceptions would have changed astronomically between being a little 
girl and becoming a woman, we rather logically still say that the subject remains the same person. 
What if the subject moved away to a foreign land where everything was the antithesis of how she 
had lived before so again her sensations, experiences and perceptions would have all been 
drastically different; but would we say she is a different person because of these changes? The 
answer would, in fact, be no- as just because her experiences have changed, they are still continuous 
with the old ones. She would still be the same person who played with specific toys as a child and 
got her first job etc.… so it would seem illogical to suggest she now had a completely different 
identity because she now had a kaleidoscope of new knowledge and experience. Is it  
incomprehensible to suggest they are not a different person now, just because they’re experiencing 
things as a man rather than as a woman? According to Locke, as long as they are retaining their 
memories and experiences then yes, regardless of the substantial changes, the subject’s identity 
would remain the same. What happens to our subject if shortly after the gender transformation they 
are in an accident and are left with partial amnesia: they can remember all of their masculine 
experiences but, not being a little girl or any of their memories as a woman. If we adhered to Locke’s 
theory, we would have to say that their identity was no longer the same as they would not be able 
to recall memories of their past or their empirical experiences from being a woman-but intuitively 
that is still the same person who played with dolls twenty years ago, they just now look very 
different and have a different life now. No one remembers every moment of their infancy and 
everyone certainly changes considerably as they develop, but would we really consider ourselves 
different people from the babies we were born as? These vast inconsistencies lead me to suggest 
that maybe there is something that ties these experiences together but something stronger than 
memory.  
  
  
Revisions to Locke’s theory  
  
  
Marya Schechtman suggests that there can be three simple revisions to the memory theory of 
psychological continuity. The first one (based on the original comment made by Joseph Butler 
(Butler, 1736 /1842) aims to tackle the objection that the memory theory is circular. This objection 
states that in order to have any kind of validity the theory must distinguish between the genuine 
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memories and the pseudo-memories –the difference is that a memory is a recollection of an 
experience the individual had whereas, a pseudo-memory is a memory an individual has of an event 
that, in fact, didn’t happen (Schechtman, 2014, p. 20). Since the memory criterion needs to define 
identity according to real memories, and real memories are defined in terms of identity, then 
basically the memory criterion defines identity in terms of itself.  
As a response to this objection, there comes a new concept of memories developed by Sydney 
Shoemaker and this is the concept of Quasi-memories. These are memory-like experiences of a 
belief about an experience that seems like a first-hand memory or memory belief which results from 
an experience that some person, but not necessarily the same person, did have. Our ordinary, 
orthodox memories are versions of these quasi-memories- however, nothing about the definition of 
quasi-memory presupposes the existence of personal identity (Schechtman, 2014, p. 22). The 
difference between the delusional and the non-delusional memory type experiences is, instead, 
defined by the cause of the apparent memory rather than the identity of the subject who had the 
memory. To defend identity in terms of quasi-memory over actual memory, we must provide a 
criterion that captures what seems relevant to the constitution of identity within actual memory, 
whilst not being circular.  
The second modification is in response to the objection I earlier mentioned from Thomas Reid who 
talked of the absurdity within the intransitivity of memory. Reid’s objection is answered by replacing 
the necessity of memory connections with the requirement of an ancestral memory. If we combine 
this with the modification of quasi-memory, then this means that in order for a past experience to 
be mine, I do not need to directly quasi- remember but be able to “quasi-remember a time at which 
I could quasi-remember a time at which I could quasi-remember a time at which could 
quasiremember the experience” (Schechtman, 2014, p. 23). In other words, one needs to be 
connected to an experience by an overlapping, inter-linked chain of quasi-memories. The third 
alteration would be the addition of connections (besides just autobiographical memory) to the 
developing criterion of personal identity. It is not necessary to believe that memory is the only 
relation that contributes to personal identity. According to Schechtman, psychological continuitists 
argue that connections between intentions and the actions that carry them out (Schechtman, 2014, 
p.24), and between the different temporal portions of persisting beliefs, values, desires, and traits, 
should be counted (Schechtman, 2014, p. 24). So then, to be classified as the same person, one 
needs a vast amount of significant connections between them and one’s self – but these do not all 
need to be memories. This addresses the concern that memories are fragile and cannot be relied 
upon. According to my earlier example, if I cannot remember a holiday from when I was nine but not 
a birthday party from the same year, then this does not question the continuity of my personal 
identity if we bear in mind other factors of my existence, like my religion, or who my parents are, for 
example.  
  
  
Derek Parfit  
  
  
If we bear in mind the three modifications we have discussed about Lockean memory criterion, we 
are now left with the view that a person at time T1 is the same person at T2 just in the case that 
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person as T2 is the same as the person in T1 because of an overlapping chain of quasi-psychological 
connections (Schechtman,2014, p.24). When this view is completely developed it is similar to that of 
Derek Parfit’s famous criterion. Parfit explains that psychological connectedness is the possession of 
particular psychological connections- “Strong psychological connectedness is the holding of at least 
half of the number of connections that are present in the life of nearly all human adult,” 
(Schechtman, 2014, p.24) and thus, then psychological continuity is the overlapping chains of the 
strong connectedness.  
There are two views concerning how psychological connectedness can exist. One view is that 
psychological connections are maintained because of something psychological that is persistent 
within the person but it is simpler to understand this by referring to dualism; this is to say that the 
continued, persistent part of someone is their soul (or in another term, their “Cartesian Ego”) and 
this soul is the consistent subject of all our experiences and sensations and furthermore the element 
that links them all together” (Korsgaard, 1996, p. 366). Instead, Parfit suggests that even if we do not 
adhere to dualism, we may still advocate the idea of a consistent psychological element- or a “deep 
further fact” about a person (Korsgaard, 1989, p. 106). Parfit calls these views “‘Non-Reductionist’ 
since the persisting subject of experiences is regarded as an irreducible entity” (Korsgaard, 1996, p. 
366). A Non - Reductionist viewpoint would be that the person is the psychological subject of 
experiences the holding of Relation-R results from identity, rather than being constitutive of it. 
However, a physicalist would most likely suggest that psychological connectedness is very simply 
explainable through physical continuity. This is because there is no need for a persisting 
psychological entity to explain connectedness and this view, is labelled as “Reductionist” by Parfit , 
as the existence of a person can be reduced to “the existence of a brain and body, and the 
occurrence of a series of interrelated physical and mental;” (Parfit, 1987, p. 211). When this concept 
is viewed alongside the idea that Relation-R is more important to personal identity than physical 
continuity, Relation-R becomes constitutive of personal identity (Korsgaard, 1996, p. 366).  
Psychological continuity is so important because it is the normal cause of psychological 
connectedness. Yet, Parfit argues that nothing important depends on the cause being normal 
(Korsgaard, 1989, p. 107). Even if we say that physicalism is true, the physical basis of our 
psychological attributes will lie in what we may call “the “formal” rather than the “material” 
properties of the nervous system” (Korsgaard, 1989, p.108) which in other words means that the 
causes of psychological connectedness can, in fact, vary. Let us now imagine (as Korsgaard suggests) 
that you are about to lose your memory due to the failure of part of your brain. However, a surgeon 
gives you the option for him to make a copy of this part of your brain which includes all of your 
memories. For you, there would be no alteration of the memories or capacity to recollect. Your body 
is constantly replacing old cells or skin for new ones, so is this really any different? The continuity 
appropriate to a living being is this “formal continuity” and Parfit says that identity is simply formal 
continuity plus uniqueness- that is, being the only formal continuer of a past self 
(Korsgaard,1989,108).  
However, overall, it is actually the continuity which is more important than the uniqueness- “If the 
essential element of a person is formal or copiable, then in principle it seems that we could make 
two equally good copies of a whole person” (Korsgaard,1989, p.109). Both of these halves would still 
be formally continuous with the original person; both would feel as if they were the original person 
and both would have the same memories, characteristics, ideas, and preferences. In this situation, 
understanding which of the halves were, in fact, the original, would be an empty question 
(Korsgaard,1989, p.109). It may not truly matter, so then how can personal identity be important?  
This is a very controversial view. According to Parfit it is actually Relation-R is what matters; this  
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Relation-R, unlike identity, is a relation we can bear to more than one person (Korsgaard,1989,  
p.110). If this is true, then what is important in the survival of a person is not whether or not the 
person survives, but whether or not someone who is adequately R-related to said person survives.  
   
Nonetheless, there is an objection that Relation-R does not carry the necessary significance, and this 
is based upon the finding that all Relation-R offers is a “formal relation between different moments 
of consciousness that amount to roughly a requirement of similarity of psychological makeup” 
(Schechtman, 2014, p. 35). In addition to this, David Lewis says- “I find what I mostly want in wanting 
survival is that my mental life should flow on. My present experiences, thoughts, beliefs, desires, and 
traits of character should have appropriate future successors … these successive states should be 
interconnected in two ways. First, by bonds of similarity. Second, by bonds of lawful causal 
dependence” (Lewis, 1983, p. 17). In other words, there is a kind of stability in the contents of the 
consciousness together with a mechanism of transition from one moment to the next. In fact, the 
moments themselves remain independent and what is actually described is of “a Humean bundle” 
rather than true unity (Schechtman, 2014, p. 37). Critics of the psychological explanation of identity 
who provide the drastic idea that formal relations between distinct moments of consciousness 
cannot provide the correct type of connection to make sense of our forensic practices (Schechtman, 
2014, p. 36). According to this idea, the relationship between my current self and my future self is 
based upon two people with incredibly similar psychology. If you had a twin who was inexplicably 
psychologically linked to you, and they committed a crime, would your psychological likeness mean 
you would be responsible? If I had said super- psychological twin it would be wrong to say I was 
responsible for her actions- just because we share a similar psychological structure does not mean I 
am responsible for how she behaves. Naturally, one would be inclined to agree, but by the same 
logic if you are not responsible for the actions of the psychologically linked twin, then neither are 
you are responsible for the actions of your past self. In other words, psychological connectedness 
and continuity are not legitimate to bestow responsibility for the actions of your past self, if all that 
links you to them is said continuity and connectedness (Schechtman, 2014, p.37).This is clearly a 
difficult concern for if we cannot be responsible for our past actions or behaviours then it causes 
great concern for our justice system for how could you be held responsible for a crime you 
committed seven months ago and, more importantly, then how can you be punished for it?  
  
  
  
“The Branch Line Case”  
  
  
However, Parfit acknowledges this dilemma and continues to try and solve it by using what he refers 
to as: “The Branch Line Case” (Parfit, 1987, p.200). In this scenario an individual walk into a 
Teletransporter in order to travel to Mars yet it seems as if nothing happens. The individual is then 
informed that this is a new machine that has actually created a replica of the subject on Mars but 
failed to eradicate the original person. It also becomes clear that as of, yet the machine is not 
flawless and as a result, the original body has been mortally damaged meaning that this individual is 
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left with only a few days to live. The person can communicate with their new replica on Mars and is 
furthermore assured there is an overwhelming amount of psychological connections between them 
and their replica in space. As there is psychological connectedness between the two, there is also 
psychological continuity between the original and the replica. Preliminarily, Parfit agrees that it 
seems as it is not going to seem like survival to the person on earth (Parfit, 1987, p. 201). In other 
words, it seems to suggest, that there is an extremely strong connection between the person who 
entered the Teletransporter and the dying individual that does not exist between the original and 
the replica on Mars. Without such connection there seems to be no basis for the person on earth to 
feel any egoistic concern for the future of the replica, nor for the replica to concern themselves with 
the original (Parfit, 1987, p. 202). One may suggest that what is lacking between the two is physical 
continuity –in particular, the sameness of the brain- and so this scenario shows that psychological 
continuity theories do, in fact, require that the psychological continuity is caused by the extended 
functioning of the same brain, if it is to be viable (Schechtman, 2014, p. 37). If this is ultimately true, 
then this adds further support to my question as to whether or not identity would survive a 
transition of gender. If a continuation of the actual, physical brain is key to successful survival of 
identity then in the scenario of the subject waking up in the body of the opposite gender, then 
seeing as the person has the same memories/personality and also the same brain- then it appears 
then this would be a successful survival regardless of a difference in gender or physical body.  
In relation to my original query, as to how the identity of an individual would survive changing 
genders, Parfit’s theory would suggest that as gender is non-physical and does not impede on the 
psychological consistency or connectedness- and the same brain would be present in the individual 
before and after the gender change- then yes, the individual’s identity would survive the gender 
change. However, what seems inconsistent is that gender is in no way affiliated with the brain, as 
already established, it is most definitely, not a physical entity. So how can it be, that the continued 
existence of a physical construction is responsible for the survival of a person after a change in a 
non-physical entity. A change in consciousness or psychological connectedness would also cease the 
survival of the identity but gender is also responsible for changes and continuations in personality, 
temperament and life experiences. So how can this be? Our gender is ascribed to us at birth in 
accordance with our sex, and is with us longer than our consciousness, as it is affiliated with us 
before we can think for ourselves or form our own memories. Even after someone has passed away, 
identification is still based upon physical form and when the dead are remembered and talked of, 
they are talked of with their gendered pronouns of “he” or “she”, meaning that our gender actually 
transcends death. Of course, when an individual is deceased, they no longer have an active social 
existence or the capacity to behave or speak. So, if gender is a social construction, how can it 
continue to exist after the social identity has become inactive? Is just sameness of brain and 
psychological continuity enough to understand our identity, when our genders and identities outlive 
the function of the brain itself? Our gender is one of the leading factors in what influences our lives 
and the experiences we have, does it really seem feasible that if something so powerful and 
influential changed, there would be no impact upon our identities at all?  
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Physicalism  
  
  
  
For hundreds of years now, scientists all over the world have been able to theorize about the 
existence of the human mind but they have never been able to observe the mind without the 
presence of a physical brain. So, if we deny the entirely psychological approach to understanding the 
mind then what are we left with? Well, of course, the opposite of the immaterial, is material. 
Philosophy has always been concerned with the idea of how as humans, we fit in with the rest of the 
world. From as far back as the ancient Greeks, we have had physical theories such as Atomism. As 
humans, of course, we are made of atoms, and according to the theory, when we die the atoms 
drain out of us and that is that. There is no persistent or eternal part of us, nothing immaterial. In 
other words, according to this theory, nothing exists but said empty space and atoms- so, in terms of 
our construction we are not fundamentally different from any other living organism. As we have 
discussed, gender is not a physical construction so, then, should not be included in our  
understanding of what people are, as people then are entirely physical. However, on the other hand, 
the idea of humans being essentially physical beings is an idea that can be difficult to comprehend; 
the idea that our memories, feelings, and experiences that have shaped our lives, are futile to our 
essential essence.  
Physicalism today has become more focused on understanding how the facts of mental life are 
reconciled with the fact that we seem to live in an essentially physical world (Kirk, 2003,p. 49) 
because how can thoughts and feelings exist so prominently in a world made entirely from physical 
entities? The evidence for physicalism is, in part, found within the world we live in but Quine 
summarised it by saying “nothing happens in the world, not the flutter of an eyelid, not the flicker of 
a thought, without some redistribution of microphysical states” (Quine, 1981, p. 98). However, 
Quine’s idea cannot be seen as an actual statement of physicalism because it is still consistent with 
dualism. Dualists who accept the causal closure of the physical have to concede that the laws of 
nature ensure that nothing happens without something physical happening (Kirk, 2003, p. 49). It 
seems the most natural version of physicalism would be the Identity Theory.  
According to one of the leading philosophers for the Identity theory, J.J.C Smart, “sensations are 
nothing over and above brain processes” (Smart, 1959, p. 163). With advances in science, 
neurologists can now offer their suggestions about what happens to the brain when we experience 
pain and the identity theorists assert that pain is only the occurrence of these brain processes.  The 
example used is that the relevant brain process for pain is known as the firing of the C-fibres, in 
other words, the psycho-physical identity thesis tells us that “pain is identical with C-Fibre firing” 
(Kirk, 2003, p. 50). This claim is revised into “having pain is identical with having one’s c-fibres firing” 
in light of the objection that pain has different properties than brain states. The Identity Theory has 
been seen as contingent and Kripke argued that if it is contingent, then it can’t really be identity. It 
seemed a question of empirical fact of whether the neural processes, supposedly identical with the 
person having pain, was the firing of C-fibres or something else entirely (Kirk, 2003, p. 51). How 
could pain necessarily be identical with that particular kind of brain process? Kripke, for example, 
said it could not.  
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Richard Rorty, on the other hand, believed that Smart’s theory was unsatisfactory. He argued that if 
we adopted this belief then eventually the language we currently use to explain and describe mental 
states could potentially become obsolete but, in reality, it probably never would. To highlight the 
difficulty this would cause I shall illustrate with an example: it would be more accurate to suggest 
that what people referred to as “demonic possession”, is in fact, a form of hallucinatory psychosis 
rather than saying that demonic possession is hallucinatory psychosis. In other words, it is better to 
say that we call ‘sensations’ are identical with brain processes, rather than saying sensations are 
identical with certain brain processes (Rorty, 1965, p. 29). This difficulty is so relevant because we 
cannot expect consistencies to uphold between the entities mentioned and used within modern or 
future science with those referred to by the more superstitious belief systems or outdated science- 
“Insisting on retaining the old terminology simply opens up awkward objections: a witch doctor 
could justifiably object that the facts about demons (that they come from hell, have forked tongues, 
etc.) have not been preserved, just as a dualist could object that the facts about sensations have not 
been preserved,” (Tartaglia, 2007, p. 76)  
  
  
  
  
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature  
  
  
In Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Rorty expresses the idea that the mind/body problem is a 
result of a combination of social-historical events and so, if our history and experiences had of been 
different, so would our view or even the existence of the mind/body problem. He discusses the 
concept that our problems-the mind/body debate, as a prime example- are “historical products” and 
so are contingently based on the past we came from. If we think about the fact that this problem is 
based so heavily on events that could, or could have not, happened, Rorty queries whether or not it 
is actually worth considering at all and furthermore, considering how many historical mishaps the 
mind/body problem trails behind it, he believes it to be unworthy of such heavy consideration.  
To reflect the futility of the problem, Rorty introduces us to a whole new race of beings from a whole 
new planet, these beings are named the Antipodeans- so-called based upon a group of 
nearforgotten materialists from Australia who attempted many revolts against Cartesian philosophy 
in the past century (Rorty, 1979, p. 83). These beings reflect humans in many ways, within 
technology, they are physically similar and even live comparable lives. However, the one 
monumental difference is the fact that the Antipodeans have no concept of “mind” but instead just 
talk about brain states. In Rorty’s tale of the Antipodeans, he discusses the “Terrans” (people of 
earth) who go to investigate the planet and its inhabitants, amongst these are two distinct groups of 
philosophers: the “softminded” and the “tough-minded”.  
 The Antipodeans also differ from humans in terms of their knowledge- The Antipodeans had their 
“enlightenment” based on Neurology and biochemistry, meaning that when the Terran’s land on 
their planet, the Antipodeans already know far more about the brain than ourselves. The similarities 
between the Terrans and the Antipodean’s extend to the fact that the Antipodeans’ use the 
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person/non-person distinction the same way the Terrans do- in other words, they include their own 
species whilst excluding other organisms, animals and machines. The key difference between the 
Terrans and the Antipodeans is, as I previously mentioned, the lack of the concept of mind within 
Antipodean existence. According to Rorty, this is because whilst Terran philosophers felt the need to 
explore and explain the existence of personhood in terms of reason, the Antipodeans had no such 
inclination nor did they experience any similar social pressure- “Terran 17th Century philosophers 
inherited the concept of the mind-as reason- and reconceived it in support of the newly emerging 
physics, but the Antipodean equivalents had nothing similar to inherit” (Tartaglia, 2007, p. 73).The 
tough-minded Terran Philosophers decide to centre their investigations on the subject on 
understanding whether or not the Antipodean’s have sensations- this divided these philosophers 
into two further categories, those who believe they do and those who believe they don’t. They 
question the Antipodeans to establish whether or not the Antipodeans talk of their brain states in 
the same way as the Terrans discuss their sensations.  
Returning, for a moment, to Rorty’s understanding of the mind/body problem, I will discuss what is 
known as “Privileged Access “ , which in other words means the internal capacity one has to 
understand their own thoughts and beliefs about their mental states, Our Privileged Access is what 
makes us more secure about what we know and believe than about the world around us or the 
beliefs of others. This concept is provided by the Cartesian concept of phenomenal states as 
subjective appearances (Tartaglia, 2007, p. 77). The main implication of having Privileged Access is 
that one cannot be false about a sensation you are having – i.e. you cannot be mistaken about a 
sensation you experience. So then, it cannot seem like you are in pain, when you aren’t (Tartaglia, 
2007, p. 78).  
If we continue with the example of pain, then if both a Terran and an Antipodean stub their toe in 
the exact same situations, then both individuals would have stimulated C-fibres however, the Terran 
would say that they felt pain, whereas the Antipodean would say that their “C-fibres had been 
stimulated” . Now, we know that the Terrans have Privileged Access meaning that they cannot be 
wrong, however, do the Antipodeans have this same skill of Privileged Access, or could they be 
wrong? When asked, the Antipodeans say that they can be wrong about the stimulation of their 
cfibres, “but that they cannot imagine it to be the case” (Rorty, 1979, p. 86). Rorty explains that an 
extra capability possessed the Antipodeans is that they can detect the brain state correlated with 
any significant sentence in their language (Tartaglia, 2007, p. 79); so, when they state their c-fibres 
have been stimulated, they say they have brain state “T-435”. However, the Antipodeans can 
actually get this brain state without the c-fibres being stimulated if, for example, they were tricked 
into believing their C-fibres were about to have these fibres stimulated.  
   
So, although the Antipodeans cannot imagine being mistaken about the C-fibres being stimulated, it 
is clearly feasible that they, in fact, can be mistaken as they could seem to have brain state T-435 
without actually having it or “Cases in which Antipodeans had T-435 but no stimulation of C-fibres 
included those in which, for example, they were strapped to what they were falsely informed was a 
torture machine, a switch was theatrically turned on, but nothing else was done,” (Rorty, 1979, p. 
86). The question that arrives is, what is the brain state for seeming to have T-435? What Rorty is 
attempting to establish here is that “the idea of a sensation as a phenomenal appearance (as 
something that you cannot be wrong about by principle) is a dispensable fiction (Tartaglia, 2007, p. 
79).Rorty believed that we could never truly be able to tell whether or not the Antipodeans really 
have sensations or not. We could never properly persuade the Antipodeans that we do have 
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sensations any more than we can be convinced that we do not. However, to Rorty, the existence of 
the Antipodeans proves that there is a way of saying everything we do now but without enveloping 
ourselves with unsolvable, metaphysical questions and so we should be accepting and adopting their 
non-metaphysical appearance/reality distinction (Tartaglia, 2007, p. 79). This is the distinction 
between getting things right and getting things wrong (Rorty, 1979, p. 84) and that the only notion 
of how things are that is necessary is the Antipodean notion of what they are inclined to say.  
Moreover, the successful survival of the Antipodeans is proof for Rorty that there is a way of living a 
successful, fulfilled life without the existence of the mind/body problem. Rorty says that “nothing 
predictive or explanatory or descriptive would be lost if we had spoken Antipodean all of our lives” 
(Rorty, 1979, p. 120), which suggests that it would be inconsequential to lose the mind-body 
problem. Antipodeans are proof that Rorty is, indeed, correct to say that it is possible to continue 
existing without talking about sensations but furthermore that topic neutral translations of 
sensation-talk present physicalism with an unnecessary burden, as Antipodeans never talked of their 
sensations, to begin with.  
On this topic, I cannot help but make the comparisons between the sensations, that Rorty discusses, 
and the existence of gender. Like the mind/body problem, gender exists as a historical, social 
construction that in potentiality we could, technically, live without. Imagine for a moment that the 
Antipodeans also live as a genderless race, a race that lived the same as us in every other capacity 
other than the fact they did not gender behaviours or each other. In our world, gender served 
throughout history to dictate roles and behaviours in order to promote survival, i.e. that men 
gathered the food because the women had to stay home with the children; but perhaps this new 
version of the Antipodeans didn’t have such a need in their culture (in a similar way to the fact the 
Antipodeans and thus such roles didn’t form, would this really impair their existence? Would their 
lives be less fruitful or less successful because they didn’t categorise each other by gendered 
behaviours? Would it somehow halt or limit their quality of life or chance of survival? From what we 
have already said about gender, in today’s day and age, it doesn’t really contribute enough to our 
lives- other than prejudice and stereotype- for it to be missed or for it to really limit the lives of 
those who don’t have it. Perhaps it is more Rortyan to say that, even with the lengthiest research 
and discussion, we will never be fully able to confirm or deny whether gender is truly part of our 
identity so is there any point continuing the discussion? As a people, we are not benefitting by 
discussing gender, but on an individual level if you do want to ascribe to a gender (or you do not) 
and this decision impacts your life then this decision should be yours. Perhaps gender is a left-over 
side effect from the evolution of a society that is now surplus to requirements, but its existence is 
perpetuated, not by metaphysical necessity – or even social need- but by our very discussion of it.  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Kripkean philosophy  
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On the other hand, the theories of Saul Kripke, by using his approach of naming and reference, by 
which certain expressions pick out their referents by necessity (Kirk, 2003, p.  
51) which means that the term refers to the same thing in every possible world. He uses the example 
of the name “Aristotle” which refers to the exact same person in all the possible worlds. In our 
world, Aristotle was one of the fathers of western philosophy, who for a time tutored Alexander the 
Great, yet there may be a world where Aristotle never even met Alexander the Great because the 
name applies to the same individual person, regardless of contingent facts. Being that particular 
individual is possible without taking up a particular occupation. These terms which have the same 
referents in every world, re what Kripke named as “Rigid Designators”- “Let's call something a rigid 
designator if in every possible world it designates the same object, a non-rigid or accidental 
designator if that is not the case. Of course, we don't require that the objects exist in all possible 
worlds... When we think of a property as essential to an object, we usually mean that it is true of 
that object in any case where it would have existed. A rigid designator of a necessary existent can be 
called strongly rigid.” (Kripke, 1980, p. 48). Kripke also included terms like pain (psychological states) 
and “C-fibres firing” (brain processing terms). If both the terms “pain” and “C-fibres firing” are rigid 
designators applying to the exact same things in every possible world; he concluded that the psycho- 
physical identity thesis should be regarded as necessary, rather than just contingent. If both terms of 
“pain” and “C-fibres” are in fact rigid designators applying to the exact same things in all and every 
possible worlds- if this is true then in the actual world we live in now, pain is identical to C-fibres 
firing, there is no possible world where this is not true- and if it is true in every possible world then it 
must be necessary (Kirk, 2003, p. 51).  
Kripke believes that, however, it could be feasible that there could be the firing of C-fibres without 
pain. He suggests that the essence of pain is to actually be aware of certain feelings and sensations, 
not to have a certain physical construction. To conclude, Kripke is saying that if the psycho-physical 
identity statements are true then “pain” and “C-fibres firing” refer to the same thing then these 
statements are necessary. Yet, these statements cannot actually be necessary because we can 
fathom the mental states in question being present without the physical processes. In other words, 
those identity statements are not actually necessary (Kirk, 2003, p. 52) … so given the earlier 
conclusion, they are not true either so, in other words, the identity theory is false. There continues 
to be controversy over Kripke’s ideas, especially over his claim that pain is a rigid designator (Kirk, 
2003, p. 53).  
Regardless of Kripke’s conclusions about the Identity theory, the idea of the rigid designators is one 
that relates to identity. If Aristotle can be Aristotle in every world without actually being the teacher 
of Alexander the Great or without being the father of western philosophy then can our names refer 
to us as the same person, if we had different jobs or even different gendered? Surely if there is a 
world where it is fathomable for Aristotle to not be a teacher then surely it is fathomable for a 
version of us to exist in the opposite gender? As an origin essentialist, Kripke believed then, that if 
Aristotle had been born from a different egg, he would not have ever been Aristotle. So, in that 
sense, Aristotle being a male (in the physical sense) is essential to him. So, in other words, it is 
essential for Aristotle to be a man, but his occupation, experiences, and personality are not 
necessarily essential. This raises a question about the different nature of the qualities of each 
person-for if it is essential for a person to have certain biological components but not for them to 
have certain, important experiences then this leads us to question which parts of our construction 
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are more important, in terms of essentialism. This can raise an interesting point if one regards the 
fact that, as I have already discussed, in many elements of society the sex or gender we ascribe to, 
effects the lives we lead. For example, if Emily Wilding Davidson had not been born a woman and 
thus spent her life being treated with prejudice – would she have ever campaigned so greatly for 
suffrage? Furthermore, without the endeavour to gain suffrage, she may not have met her untimely 
and tragic death and would possibly have gone on to lead a long mundane life or done something 
else striking that changed the world. Basically, in many ways our origins do go on to shape and 
change the lives we develop whereas experiences themselves are contingent upon many other 
elements like culture, psychology and social background, and many of these things are determinable 
by our origins. So, perhaps it is logical to agree that our origins are essential to us, however, is our 
gender part of our origins?  
Judith Butler’s idea was that from the moment we are born we are gendered from the physical form 
we have, and we continue to live our lives classifying ourselves -and being classified by others- as 
this certain gender. However, our biological origins -i.e. the egg we came from or the parents we are 
born from –are not questionable or deniable. It isn’t decided by anyone or anything -other than the 
natural laws of biology- whereas gender, on the other hand, can be a subjective element. Some 
parents, for example, have a biological daughter but choose to raise their child with a masculine 
gender or even as gender-neutral and this child will then be raised as this chosen gender. As a result, 
this child would either be treated as that gender by others or shunned by others because their 
gender does not match their biological sex, or they may experience prejudice because their chosen 
gender is seen as weaker or somehow inferior within their culture. Now, for the child, this gender 
has been with them for their whole lives, from before they were capable of making memories so it 
could be said that this gender classification is part of their identity. However, to me, this is a 
troubling rationale. Our biological sex is determined by process and function; it will not be different 
depending on what religion you are born in to or the kind of parents you are born of. So how can the 
two be both part of our essential origins? However, if we view this from a Rortyan perspective, one 
could say that if we just say, ‘what we call “gender”’, rather than thinking we have to account for 
gender itself, the problem is lessened, arguably goes away. We cannot deny that our parental 
upbringing or our culture does significantly impact upon the lives we go on to lead, but these things 
are all contingent; whereas the biological egg we came from, the defects or illnesses that we are 
born with are very often the faults of no-one but the unfortunate mishap of the biological machine. 
It does not seem logical to say that both gender and biological circumstances can both be essential, 
in terms of origins. Gender is a social status, that may one day be obsolete, that has different levels 
of significance in different cultures and different perceptions whereas people will for the rest of 
time, as they have since the beginning of time, be born with either male or female genitalia and 
irreversibly come from a specific, individual egg. Although people may choose to have surgery to 
change their sex or in situations where babies are born from test-tubes- a child being born will still 
require, in one way or another, being born from an egg, which will form either a male or female 
baby and this is that individual’s origins. Our biological origins are indeterminable and exist before 
we do- our current existence depends on the certain egg and sperm that were created for 
fertilization- whereas our gender is decided for us, whilst we already exist. With biological origins 
there is no decision nor contemplation, the reproductive system creates the foetus and the 
combination of genes and DNA makes a baby with specific coloured eyes or specific health 
conditions or specific blood-types.  
Regardless of its effect on our lives, gender is, somewhat decision and as a decision, it is one that 
could just as easily stop existing, or change, whereas our biological origins cannot and will not 
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change. Although gender is more often than not decided upon or ascribed due to the biology of the 
infant-i.e. gender is usually based on the sexual organs of the person- technically, one could raise 
their child as the opposite gender than is associated with their biology- for example, if you gave birth 
to a biologically male child but chose to raise them to have the female aspects of gender and then 
they, although their biology would be male, the child would basically have a female gender. 
However, if one had a biologically male baby but you then told everyone they were, in fact, a 
biologically female baby, and dressed them and named them according to the supposed female 
gender, the child would still be biologically male, regardless of society’s misconception of their 
biology. Perhaps this is why Kripkean philosophy of identity works as it does, it is illogical to imagine 
ourselves coming from a different egg, or even from different parentage, and still be the same 
person… but is it wrong to imagine ourselves as the opposite gender?  
If this is to be accepted, then one would be suggesting that our physical bodies are essentially more 
important to our identity than mental constructs such as gender. This can be corroborated by the 
ideology of physicalism as it expresses the idea that human existence is essentially physical. 
However, an immaterialist could have a similar point of view in the fact that the soul doesn’t 
necessarily have to have a gender (it doesn’t even have a biological sex). As we have already 
discussed, gender has no physical destination, it is not part of our brain or threaded in our DNA, so it 
would appear that if we, do in fact, adhere to physicalism then gender becomes obsolete. Of course, 
gender is a mental construct, but does that mean it does not have physical causation or physical 
effects? For example, if we refer to Aristotle’s criteria for men and women, it is a list of purely 
nonmaterial qualities, such as compassion, emotional strength and irrationality, to name but a few. 
Yet isn’t it entirely rational to expect men, and women to be different, considering the great 
biological differences between the two? The stereotypically renowned qualities that women are said 
to have -being nurturing, emotional, etc.- all match up with the fact that women are the ones 
capable of having children. With this in mind, women and men will inevitably have different social 
roles because regardless of any beliefs about gender or inequality, men are not the ones able to 
have babies so of course, this leads to a different attitude towards the two sexes. Women have the 
babies so there is this expectation of them being “maternal”- which explains why the feminine 
gender is also correlated with maternal qualities- and so, if the woman is the one having children 
and thus raising them, then it comes to the men to be responsible for gathering food, providing 
shelter etc. This is not to say that women are incapable of providing, but biologically, their role has 
been established by the ability to carry children.  
We have also discussed the fact that our own brain shape and hormones differ depend on our 
physical sex. Does this mean there is a biological cause of the non-material qualities of gender? In 
other words, does the differing shapes of the brain or the different combinations of hormones 
produce the personality traits and qualities that each gender is seen to possess? This would explain 
why it is typically women possessing the feminine gender and men possessing the masculine. In the 
early 1900’s it was discussed that the fact that women had a larger Corpus Callosum could explain 
why women seemed more intuitive-hence the term of “women’s intuition”- in other words, 
explaining that women were more emotive beings due to the increased size of the Corpus Callosum 
(Rivers, 2013, p. 26). This began a flux of ideas suggesting that this brain difference between the two 
sexes could provide a solid answer as to why the sexes are seen to act so differently. This would, of 
course, provide a physical account of gender – not only would we then be suggesting that gendered 
stereotypes are consequences from biological construction. Furthermore, this could also fall in line 
with Smart’s idea that although gender appears to be some sort of immaterial, social sensation, it is 
,in fact, a brain process and that the two cannot be separated; you cannot explain gender without 
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using brain construction and the construction of the brain births gender. In 1997 however, it was 
published in the Neuroscience and Behaviour review that evidence from recent MRI studies, shows 
there is no significant statistical difference between the Corpus Callosum in either of the sexes 
(Rivers, 2013, p. 28). So once again, we have lost the biological root of gender. Although we still have 
the effect of hormones upon the body, there are so many exceptions and conditions that affect 
hormones that it would be impossible to make any sort of fair or logical assertion as to the true 
effect of hormones upon the existence of gendered behaviour. So, although physicalism may be 
seen to some as a more logical explanation to identity and human existence, in terms of gender, it 
seems to fall short because there seems to be a weak connection between the metal properties of 
gender and any physical processes. On a non- physicalist perspective, however, there is still the 
capacity to say the same thing but with little need to consider the latest scientific revelation for their 
theories.  
   
However, although we can say that our gender is a choice, and our biology is not, there is some 
doubt as to whether this is accurate. It is logical to suggest that our biological make-up is, in fact 
indeterminable, but what we mean by this is that our biological construction is indeterminable by 
the human free will not by the laws of nature. It is quite often assumed that our biological 
construction determines the gender we are ascribed, so in that sense, our gender is as 
predetermined as our biological makeup. Therefore, if physicalism is to be seen as true, one can 
suggest that the existence of gender in the first place, although it has mainly social consequences, 
has a metaphysically determined existence. Furthermore, from a determinism perspective, hard 
determinists do not advocate the concepts of free-will so if we are to say that our biological 
construction is determined, then it seems illogical to suggest that then gender is based upon a 
decision of free will.  
  
  
  
  
Animalism  
  
  
  
One other argument expressing the concept of physicality is the idea of animalism. This is a widely 
unpopular view in philosophy, with further rejections from famous philosophers such as Plato, 
Spinoza, and Locke, to name but a few. Yet, I will discuss the theory as expressed by Eric Olson. 
Olson’s theory begins by underlying and restructuring the common misconceptions that currently 
exist around the theory of animalism, he expresses the point that animalism- as he perceives it to 
be- is currently very misunderstood, given the fact that currently philosophers and other thinkers, 
mislabel animalism as a theory that states: “that each of us is a non-animal that relates in some 
intimate way to an animal. They put it by saying that we are animals because that sounds more 
plausible,” (Olson, 2003, p. 320) which is suggesting that within other variations of animalism, the 
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theorists are saying that humans are animals but not reinforcing it with their actual theories, yet, he 
is earnest to point out that these ideas are not true “animalist” ideas.  
Olson’s explanation of animalism relies on the pre-assumed concept that each concrete particular 
belongs to one and only one kind (Schetman, 2014, p. 214). In other words, the “kind” that each 
entity belongs to defines the individual’s essential properties without which, the entity would no 
longer be the same and thus cease to exist as that entity. For example, although a baby changes and 
develops into a grown adult, which looks and sounds and behaves very differently from its original 
baby form, it doesn’t stop existing as a human. This explains, why throughout one’s life although we 
may appear very different or change the way we look, or even lose limbs, we remain essentially the 
same type- a human. Olson’s theory relies on two further distinctions: the distinction between a 
phase sortal and a substance concept. A substance concept is what Olson refers to as the term that 
names essential kinds (Olson, 2003, p. 320), whereas a phase sortal, on the other hand, is properties 
of an entity that exist throughout its lifetime, but that it could exist without ceasing to exist. These 
two distinct categories can of course be likened to Aristotle’s concept of essence and accident, i.e. 
the differentiation between properties that are essential to our existence and those which just so 
happen to be a part of us. The two responses to personal identity are, of course, fundamentally, the 
psychological approach and the biological approach and according to Olson, the difference between 
the two rests on whether or not the term “person” is a substance concept or a phase sortal.  
For those that adhere to the idea of psychological explanations, then yes, the term person is a 
substance concept. Olson uses John Locke’s definition of a human and so, by that definition, if an 
individual fell into a vegetative state-for example-, then they would no longer be a person  
(Schetman, 2014, p. 16). If “person” is, in fact, our substance concept then we could not continue to 
exist as nonpersons, so in other words, those who sadly fall into a vegetative state, cease to exist. On 
the other hand, if “human” was our substance concept then if someone did fall into a vegetative 
state they would continue to exist, they would just no longer be a person (Schetman, 2014, p. 16).  
However, as I already stated an entity can only have one substance concept. If both “human-animal” 
and “person” are substance concepts and we are essentially “persons” then we cannot be human 
animals. This raises what is known as “The Foetus Problem” which is the fact that if we are 
essentially persons, then in fact, we could not actually have been a foetus. This is because a Foetus 
lacks all the qualities needed to be a person- as John Locke describes- just as an individual in a 
vegetative state could not be a person. Furthermore, what then happens to the foetus when it 
develops into a thinking human which does fit in with the psychological criteria required to be a 
person. Does that Foetus just cease to exist, and a new entity begins? Or, are there two distinct, but 
completely coincidental, entities (i.e. the person and the animal) that then coexist (Schetman, 2014, 
p. 17)? Having these two entities in coexistence brings about its own problems which are known as 
“The Thinking Animal Argument”. This is the concern about the fact that- remembering that the two 
entities coincide exactly- how can it be that the person is thinking but that the animal is not?  
So then, if an individual does indeed fall into a vegetative state, does that person just cease to exist 
and then just leave an animal in their place- that looks identically the same, but is in actuality, a 
completely distinct entity? Also, Olson asks: is the animal that is left behind the same entity as the 
Foetus which existed before the being developed into a person? In other words, “the fact that each 
human animal starts out as an unthinking embryo and may end up as an unthinking vegetable, 
shows that no mental continuity is necessary for a human- animal to persist,” (Olson, 2003, p. 324). 
Olson believes that although these questions are very difficult to answer, they are actually 
eradicated if we say that the term “person” is a phase sortal. This would explain why throughout an 
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individual’s life; they continue to exist as the same entity but do not always exist as a person – i.e. 
when they are a foetus or if they did happen to fall into a comatose or vegetative state.  
Olson’s argument for animalism then rests on the fact that, in light of the given complications, it 
makes far more sense to say that “human-animal” is our substance concept and that “person” is a 
phase sortal, rather than the other way around. Furthermore, for Olson, the typical question of 
identity (“what makes a person at time T1 and a person at time T2 the same person?” (Schetman, 
2014, p. 17)) confuses the matter with the implication that in order for a person to survive then they 
must survive as a person, whereas in actuality there is at least one time in everyone’s life to not be a 
person, and the potentiality to not be a person throughout your existence. It is only true that we 
must exist as “persons” for our whole lives if “person” is our substance concept. In light of this, it is 
Olson’s idea that in fact, we should replace the question of identity with “what makes a person at 
one time identical to anything at a later time?” (Schetman, 2014, p. 17).  
If we apply the concept of substance concepts and phase sortals to the topic of gender then there is 
a very simple and conclusive answer- if individuals can only have one substance concept, which for 
us is “human-animal” (according to Olson) then this would mean that gender is a phase sortal, 
meaning it is something that we can have but do not need and something that can be fluid 
throughout our lives, without impacting our actual existence. In other words, if a person awoke in 
the morning identifying as the opposite gender then this would not actually impact their existence, it 
may affect their behaviours, their psychological patterns and possibly their social experiences, but as 
all of these are not substance concepts, there would be no impact upon the individuals actual 
identity- meaning in other words that although someone’s gender may change or fluctuate they 
(according to this theory of Animalism) will remain the same person.  
  
  
Problems with animalism  
  
  
There are two main ways in which philosophers could respond to this theory of animalism. The first 
option maintains the fact that the biological approach isn’t, in fact, immune to the difficulties that 
have been raised against the psychological view. In response to Olson’s “Vegetable problem” is what 
known as “the corpse problem” – this is the question as to where a corpse comes from? When an 
animal dies, there is a corpse left that is materially coincident and spatiotemporally continuous with 
the animal that just died (Schetman, 2014, p. 18). Where does this corpse come from; does it fall 
into existence at the exact moment that the living animal dies?  
In response, Olson’s “Foetus problem” is what is known as the “zygote problem”. The problem is 
that the Zygote cannot be identical with any human because, of course, as of yet, it is not human. 
So, what happens to the Zygote when it develops further into a foetus? Does it just cease to exist, by 
gaining complexity (Schetman, 2014, p. 18)? Lastly, in response to the “Thinking Animal Problem,” 
we have what is known as “The Thinking parts” problem- the entails the idea that every animal has 
many parts, parts large and complex enough to think. So, then when every animal thinks “I am an 
animal” (Schetman, 2014, p. 19) there is also the brain (or another thinker) and yet another thinker, 
which is considered to be the top half of the animal, simultaneously thinking the same thought.  
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The second response is what is known as the “Constitution theory” which can be described as an 
account between the relationship between persons and animals but that also manages to avoid the 
difficulties that Olson raises about other theories. According to the Constitution theory, human 
persons are not identical to human animals but are constituted by them. In this sense, constitution 
can be defined as the relation that an entity has to the substance it is made from – i.e. a flag could 
be said to be constituted by cloth, or a table to be constituted by wood. The strongest form of the 
constitution theory is documented by Lynne Rudder Baker- “Lynne Rudder Baker and many others 
think that paradigmatic instances of one object constituting another — a piece of marble 
constituting a statue, or an aggregate of particles constituting a living body — involve two distinct 
(i.e., not numerically identical) objects in the same place at the same time” (Zimmerman, 2002, p. 
295).  
Baker defines “persons” in terms of being in possession of what is known as a strong “first- person 
perspective”- which is known as a “form of reflective self-consciousness that allows, for instance, to 
articulate concerns about our own continued existence and about our relations to others in the 
world”. In other words, our first-person perspective is the fact that we can ponder our existence and 
our position in the world, which is what makes us a person and thus distinct from other animals. If a 
human-animal develops this perspective then this gives way to the existence of a new entity-or in 
other words, a “person”-. A person then, for example, is constituted by the human-animal but is still 
only one being in existence, in other words, there is no distinction between the person and the 
human-animal once the first-person perspective has been developed. The human-animal begins its 
existence as a foetus and, so if this animal develops into a being with this first-person perspective 
then the original animal does not cease to exist but at the same time loses its independent 
existence. This theory then can answer the queries raised by animalism, regarding the relationship 
between persons and human beings. If we think back to the thought experiment used by Olson and 
consider the situation of an individual who falls into a vegetative state and then loses their 
firstperson perspective. In this situation, the person would cease to exist, and the animal would 
regain its independent existence. In this situation, the original “foetus” and “vegetable” problem are 
no longer problems because the human-animal and the person are not two entities but one- so 
there is just one thinker of each thought.  
Although the constitution theory helps to eradicate certain problems of animalism, the theory isn’t 
without its own difficulties. The primary difficulty is that it isn’t actually clear how we could tell if we 
have the same first-person perspective from one moment, to another which makes the theory 
vulnerable to the same issues faced by other identity theories that use the soul to explain personal 
identity. Furthermore, animalists argue that the addition of psychological capacities makes a new 
entity (Schetman, 2014, p. 20). The debate between the constitution theory and animalism comes 
down to the differences in metaphysical presuppositions and disagreement about whether value 
and relational properties can be part of what constitutes the metaphysical identity of an object 
(Schetman, 2014, p. 20). The existence of debate between the biological and psychological theories 
are unlikely to cease. The increasing presence of the biological theory acts as an undeniably strong 
opponent to psychological views. This has created an extra important dimension to the more 
modern understanding of personal identity, raising fruitful questions that have been largely 
neglected in recent years (Schetman, 2014, p. 20).  
Another argument in defence of the Animalism theory is called the Animal Ancestor Argument which 
states that if one denies that an individual is not an animal then this would mean that their parents 
were not animals and that their parents were not animals and then of course that their parents 
weren’t animals and so on. One repercussion of this theory is the fact that it undermines the  
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premise of the evolutionary theory, and as one of the most prevalent and important theories, the 
rejection of evolution may be a too greater cost for many people. On the other hand, it could be 
argued that we may originate from animals but in fact, we are no longer animals. It could be said 
that that we are related to animals but that in fact, our closer and more modern relatives are 
actually human. Furthermore, Sydney Shoemaker believed there is an ambiguity in the term 
“animal”. The first distinction is “biological” or otherwise defined as a creature whose persistence 
conditions are purely biological (Blatti, 2012, p. 688)- they have the necessary condition of 
“continued living”. The second distinction refers to creatures that are subject to mental properties 
that are non-identically constituted by biological animals (Blatti, p.688,2012). Shoemaker makes this 
distinction based upon “what determines the nature of any sort of persisting thing” (Shoemaker, 
2011, p. 353). The distinction between the two terms shows that, in fact, it may be too extreme to 
say that claims of evolution only focus on the biological distinction. So, when animalism advocates 
the claim that every one of us is identical with an animal, in fact, the statement refers to the second 
type within the distinction rather than just, referring to biological referents. By creating the 
distinction, Shoemaker allows for the animalist concept that everyone is identical with an animal and 
that this follows from evolutionary theory. So, this maintains that the animal ancestor argument 
overstates its position by concluding that the truth behind animalism follows on from the 
evolutionary theory (Schetman, 2014, p. 21).  
Although animalism may have its flaws as a theory, the concept of phase sortals still seems to work 
successfully to explain why one person can be so many different things without changing or losing 
their identity. Yet, if gender is a phase sortal (which this theory would suggest it is) then technically 
one should be able to change gender without losing their identity, however, this seems a little too 
straight forward. Of course, as the theory states, technically gender is a part of our lives like age, 
that can change and alter as we develop, without losing what it is to be “us”, however, our identity 
(in part) depends on the experiences we have as the gender we associate with. For example, girls 
who experience prejudice may grow up to be political or a feminist in light of being over-looked or 
excluded, yet if that same human had been born with a masculine gender, they may still have grown 
up to be believers in equal rights, but they probably wouldn’t have grown to be a feminist as they 
didn’t have the pivotal experiences that led them to such a career choice. In other words, on a 
fundamental human level, one could change genders without losing their identity, however, the 
social repercussions would dramatically alter one’s life experiences. When one changes any of their 
social roles, there is an expectation that your behaviour will alter accordingly and similarly, changing 
genders will alter what is expected of you and what you will experience. Animalism, although 
logically possible, lacks the emphasis on two of the biggest things in a person’s life: experience and 
psychology.  
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Then why does gender continue to exist?  
  
  
As we have already discussed, Gender is not part of our physical construction, so according to the 
ideology of physicalism, gender becomes fundamentally irrelevant- if the human construction is 
purely physical, then gender is not essential, as it is either psychological, or social. However, I am not 
convinced it is that straightforward. Gender may not have a strong presence in our physical bodies, 
but to understand the identity of a human, it seems clear to me that you have to search deeper than 
just our biology.  
  
From a political perspective, perhaps it is more obvious why gender continues to exist. As we 
discussed earlier, Simone De Beauvoir firmly believed that the patriarchy’s main aim is to encourage 
the social progression of men, whilst subsequently repressing the progression of women. In other 
words, the notion of gender exists to define and separate those who will live a life of subservience 
and those who will go on to achieve power. This isn’t an elective process by women- women do not 
choose repression or to think negatively about their existence, it is forced upon them by society: 
“The interwovenness of body and mind helps explain women’s oppression. Women do not choose to 
think about their bodies and bodily processes negatively; rather they are forced to do so as a result 
of being embedded in a hostile patriarchal society,” (Joseph, 2008). For as long as gender continues 
to exist, the division between men and women will remain.  Furthermore, for as long as this division 
remains the patriarchy will be sustained, subsequently meaning that stereotypical male-dominance 
will be continually perpetuated.   
  
 Hypothetically, to undo the social distinction between men and women we would need to remove 
the cause of the unbalance- the gender divide.  For this, there is two options – the first would be 
removing the distinctions of gender completely- to stop people being oppressed by their sex and 
physical characteristics. The second option, however, refers to those who wish to maintain the 
gender distinctions in order to defend the rights and protect the lives of women who have been 
penalized by the patriarchy in some way. This second distinction is most obvious in the recent 
MeToo and TimesUp movements, which are both trying to raise awareness of the men who have 
abused their power over women- or, in other words, “an astounding upwelling of emboldened and 
infuriated women saying time’s up to sexual harassment and assault” (Rinhart, 2019).  This second 
option refers not to equalizing the rights of people in general without the distinction of gender, but 
in fact removing the patriarchy in the first place. To stop women from being oppressed for being 
women.  Although women are finally starting to uphold powerful political and economic roles, the 
idea of a powerful woman is still a somewhat “novel” concept (Rinhart, 2019). This second 
distinction is about making women visible as a powerful group of people, rather than as Simone De 
Beauvoir suggested, merely a secondary sex. In other words, this second distinction is about 
dismantling the patriarchy by gaining the attribution and acknowledgement of women’s power 
instead of removing the existence of gender altogether.   
On a more personal level, the gender we ascribe to can have a huge impact on some people’s 
perceptions of themselves, and their place in the world. For example, the term “Transgender” is 
defined as “a very broad term to include all sorts of trans people. It includes cross dressers, people 
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with a dual or no gender identity, and transsexual people. It is also used to define a political and 
social community that is inclusive of transsexual people, transgender people, cross-dressers 
(transvestites), and other groups of “gender-variant” people’” (Whittle et al, p. 85, 2007). If gender is 
not part of our identity then it seems inconceivable that members of the transgender community, 
would feel as if they were assigned the “wrong” gender and that they would live their lives behaving 
and dressing as something other than that what they biologically are. If gender does not impact our 
identity, then would it matter how we dressed, the makeup we wore or the name we gave 
ourselves? Due to the fact that gender does impact upon our identities, Transgender individuals, 
unlike transsexual people, do not try to change their biological forms but instead live their lives as 
the gender they feel they should be. It has already been established that part of our identity is how 
we portray ourselves, so clearly, for these individuals, gender is a huge and unignorable part of 
theirs. Transgender individuals are sometimes innocent victims of acts of horrific and degrading hate 
crime and yet they go through all of this to act and portray themselves as the gender they believe 
themselves to be. If they didn’t believe gender to be an integral and vital element of their identities 
then why put themselves through the stigma, abuse and social ostracization of showing themselves 
as a transgender person? However, does this really mean that they are right to believe that their 
gender is integral? Perhaps being born or developing the understanding that they have the wrong 
gender alters their perception of the matter. Maybe the clash between those who believe in the 
importance of gender and those who do not is what causes prejudice towards transgender people in 
the first place. Yet, if gender isn’t important to people’s existence, how does it become so drastically 
important to the transgender community? Other than a difference of perception about gender, the 
transgender community is no different from the rest of society, they are still physically and 
biologically the same as any other person so how can we explain such a difference? There may be 
some environmental or psychological reason for this opposing opinion, however, if people are purely 
physical constructions then there is very little emphasis to place on whatever reason there is for this 
difference, so it remains difficult to comprehend. Furthermore, let us entertain the fact that, instead 
of the emphasis upon gender being a difference of perception, perhaps it is just a falsehood. The 
human psyche is vulnerable to mistakes – hallucinations, false memories and loss of empirical senses 
are just a few ways that the human mind can be deceived or incorrect, is it so inconceivable to 
assume that some people may also be wrong about the importance of their gender?  
On paper, it is easy to eradicate gender from the construction of our personal identity, easy to 
approach the subject from a purely logical, impersonal perspective. Yet for some, their gender is the 
reason for family estrangement, abuse and even, tragically, suicide. In this way, to truly understand 
the influence of gender on real people we need to examine the effect it has on the lives of those 
same people. It seems important here to acknowledge why we shouldn’t underestimate social 
constructs. For a plethora of members of many cultures and societies, their lives -both personal and 
professional- are dominated by one of the most important social constructs of all – money. We 
spend hours upon hours in offices or conducting manual labour or training to gain, what is 
effectively printed paper that has been given a financial value by people. People dedicate the 
majority of their lives, to be handed an envelope full of paper at the end of every month, or even 
more absurdly in this day and age, to see the number in your account rise when you look at the 
small screen of your phone. Today, with wages being transferred electronically, you are actually 
being handed nothing for your labours. We pay for things using contactless technology, spending 
money that we cannot see, that we have never seen and that the person behind the counter will 
never see either. If this doesn’t highlight the extent and power a social construct can have over a 
population, then I don’t believe anything can. Money demonstrates how people will dedicate their 
lives to earn something intangible. This is similar to gender, our lives are classified or ruled by an 
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invisible, category placed upon us, because of the way our biological bodies were formed in the 
womb. If anything, it may be more accurate to say that social constructs-although contingent upon 
social history and culture- is one of the strongest, most dominating forces we experience as people. 
It may be relatively easy to dismiss gender as the leftovers of the traditional man/woman 
stereotypes, but in reality, as a social construct, gender is virtually unbeatable, because those who 
deny gender norms are far more likely to have negative repercussions. It was Abraham Maslow’s 
“Hierarchy of Needs” theory (Maslow, 1943) that first proposed the idea that humans have stages of 
needs and requirements to fulfil before they can reach self-actualisation, in other words before we 
can become our best selves. If we combine this theory with Judith Butler’s theory of the  
Heterosexual Matrix (as I discussed earlier) then I think we are more able to understand the role and 
position that gender plays in our lives, as a social construct, and how it has become so influential 
upon our existence.  
   
  
The Hierarchy of Needs  
  
  
Butler’s Heterosexual matrix poses the idea that “there is a grid of naturalized bodies, gender, and 
desires, meaning that a viewer looking at a person knows that person’s sex, gender, and sexuality. 
The problem with the heterosexual matrix is that it only allows for a certain number of identities and 
all others are outside of it and are erased or ignored,” (Comstock, 2017)- in other words, according 
to the matrix there are a set of attributes a person can have which is “normal” and “natural” and 
anything that deviates from that is then, unnatural and alien. On the other hand, Maslow’s theory 
explains how human needs are structured in a hierarchy - needs lower down in the hierarchy must 
be satisfied before individuals can attend to needs higher up. From the bottom of the hierarchy 
upwards, the needs are- physiological, safety, love and belonging, esteem and self-actualization 
(McLeod, 2018).  
The first basis of the hierarchy is based around physiological needs such as food and water which is, 
of course, necessary for all humans. But as the hierarchy develops it becomes more obvious as to 
where the Heterosexual matrix could align with this. For example, the second tier of the hierarchy is 
for our safety and security needs, and as I mentioned earlier, transgender individuals are often faced 
with physical and emotional abuse and violent experiences so there is an incredibly strong possibility 
for them to experience danger. In other words, according to the Matrix, individuals who are not part 
of the transgender population do not have the same increased danger risk. The heterosexual matrix 
explains that in our society, it is really the heterosexual, strictly gendered, white individuals who fit 
in with the social norms. Although these people may have individual reasons for being afraid or 
fearing for their lives, for their group as a whole they do not have the same experiences with 
insecurity and fear as those who are transgender or deviate from their gender norms. Besides, 
transgender people are often excluded and ostracized from society by simple things such as 
gendered greetings, gendered jobs, gendered signs, and gendered clothes- to name but a few.  
The third tier on the hierarchy explains the need for us to have a feeling of belonging and love, in 
other words, “The need for interpersonal relationships motivates behaviour” (McLeod, 2018). So, 
there is, according to the heterosexual matrix, two set genders, and within these genders there is a 
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sense of belonging, so, for those who deviate from traditional gender norms, they are excluded from 
these populations. Furthermore, relating to the second tier, rather than feeling warmth and love 
from the rest of the world, transgender people often feel ostracization and coldness through 
exclusion and prejudice. This is not to say that of course transgender people never feel love or are 
unable to maintain relationships, however, if we are able to look at society as a whole, they are very 
often excluded. The third tier, in part, is being included in a group and feeling a sense of belonging. 
By being excluded and isolated from the rest of society it is incredibly unlikely that transgender 
people feel like they belong within their society, alongside the individuals that do not feel isolation 
due to their position in the heterosexual matrix.  
The fourth tier explains how people need to have certain esteem needs to be satiated- which 
Maslow classified into two categories: “esteem for oneself (dignity, achievement, mastery, 
independence) and also the desire for reputation or respect from others (e.g., status, prestige). 
Maslow indicated that the need for respect or reputation is most important for children and 
adolescents and precedes real self-esteem or dignity,” (McLeod, 2018). So, in other words, Maslow is 
highlighting that approval from society is actually more important to young people than their own 
self-respect or self-worth. So, if a transgender adolescent is shunned by society as a result of their 
gender then it is far more damaging for them to have this experience then it is for them to question 
themselves. For me, personally, this draws attention to the difficulty that is facing society, 
concerning the gender problem. As gender is rooted in society, rather than within the psyche, it 
should have less of a personal impact upon each individual, but in fact, as Maslow’s theory 
demonstrated, societies’ opinions about us are more important than our own opinions, and for as 
long as this is the case, our social identity has become more important to us than our own, personal 
identity. This means that the existence of gender as part of our social identity will repeatedly give 
gender unequivocal importance. In terms of self-esteem, “Due to social stigma, isolation, mental 
anguish, physical discomfort, or infertility, many transgender individuals never seek help. They have 
increased chances of Mental health problems, physical health problems, High risk for drug and 
alcohol abuse, suicide or attempt suicide, etc. Today so many transgender people are not expressing 
their identity as transgender due to the attitude of the society” (Suresh, 2017). By not being 
accepted by society and very often by their own families, it can cause transgender people to have 
perpetually low self-esteem and an increased risk of mental health problems and even, tragically, 
suicidal tendencies (Suresh, 2017).  
Finally, the last tier of Maslow’s theory is called the tier of “Self-actualisation”, which in other words 
is known as fulfilling one’s ultimate potential- no one can be at this stage without fulfilling the rest of 
the tiers before that and as I have indicated, it is even more difficult for the transgender community 
to fulfil any of these tiers meaning it is even less likely for these individuals to reach their full 
potential. Once again, if we look at the Heterosexual matrix then this reinforces what the hierarchy 
of needs reflects-in other words that for those individuals who differ from what is considered 
“socially normal” will find it more difficult to progress within themselves and society.  
I have already asked the question of why something that seems to have no actual part in our 
composition has such an oppressing, prominent effect in our lives. By comparing Maslow’s theory to 
the Heterosexual matrix (as posed by Butler) it seems clear that although identity is not an integral 
part of us, it affects something that is an integral part of us -our psychology. We have already 
established that the theory of animalism doesn’t explain the relationship between our identity and 
the existence of our gender, because it doesn’t account for our psychology. The way we think about 
ourselves and others creates our personal identity and affirms the identity of others. Maslow’s 
theory demonstrates how undeniable our psychological wellbeing is to our identity, as our lives are 
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undeniably shaped by our psychological state. For example, if we refer to Maslow’s hierarchy, for 
transgender individuals, or those who deviate from social norms, these people would struggle with 
lack of acceptance, a limited sense of belonging or security which causes negative experiences and 
emotions, which ultimately affects the construction of their consciousness. In other words, 
regardless of our beliefs as to what gender is or where it comes from, it has the potential to shape 
the life and identity of almost every individual, in one way or another.  
This is what I consider to be most important about gender, even though its existence is socially 
contingent, the impact it has upon us is immense and unyielding. If we use Rortyan thinking to 
remind ourselves that if our social history had been different, gender would never have existed, then 
it could, on the one hand, weaken the concept of gender for how could something be so pivotal in 
our society that, in slightly different circumstances, may never have even existed? However, in 
reality, regardless of whether or not gender is essential and regardless of whether it is the 
consequence of social structure, gender in some way or another, influences the psychology and the 
behaviour of every single person and this makes it one of the most powerful constructs in human 
existence. If we are to understand Maslow’s theory as accurate, then the perception of gender alone 
can restrict the optimal potential of all people, in every culture. For example, as I have previously 
stated, our experiences are what form our consciousness and our consciousness is what constructs 
our identity, so in other words: by being part of the transgender community, people experience 
prejudice, loneliness, ostracization and lack of acceptance which has affected not only their position 
in society, but in turn affected their psychological well-being. Ultimately, in regard to the 
transgender community, we can see why gender could be seen as part of our identity.  
However, should this be the case? Should the somewhat outdated restrictions of gender have such 
life-altering impact on our existence? Although I can understand why gender has, historically, had 
such an impact upon us, and I can understand why -to an extent- people have continued to live their 
lives under the restrictions gender enforces. Where I become perplexed, is when I try to understand 
why Gender is continuing to exist and continuing to restrict us. Thankfully, our society has made 
important advancements towards not labelling people, or behaviour, due to race, religion or 
sexuality which is what makes the enforcement of gender, so incomprehensible. We no longer live in 
a society that requires men and women to be different, or to be treated differently- we have made 
wonderful progressions towards equality, meaning that there is now the capacity for men and 
women to live equally, professionally and personally. The one thing that prevents this being entirely 
successful is the misguided notion that men and women have a different capacity, just because of 
their gender. It may be that brain shape or hormones affect the way that those of either sex 
perform, however, this is no more the individual’s fault than a disability or impediment would be. 
Yet, in actual fact, traditional metaphysical thinking on this matter does not support treating gender 
as essential to us. We limit people’s opportunities and possibilities as a result of it. If we treated, 
judged and interacted with people as we found them to be, then gender would quickly be 
diminished, for it is the expectation we hold of others that causes us to pass unnecessary 
judgements of other people and be judged the same way ourselves. If we very briefly review the 
theories we have already discussed, we can see that Aristotle said that gender could only be a 
Typeone change meaning it could not affect the essence of an individual; Lockean theories suggest 
gender is not part of our essence as Locke does not classify individuals for membership by specific 
traits and Quine believed that gender could not be an essential property, because we are not 
essentially anything to begin with. Furthermore, as an origin essentialist, it seems unlikely that  
Kripke could see gender as our essence as it is not part of our origins. The Rortyan perspective, 
ultimately teaches us that as a contingent element of a contingent society, it is unlikely we could 
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ever truly understand gender and that, much like the mind/body problem, gender exists because we 
allow it too through our discussions and interactions, rather than its existing independently. 
Animalism shows that gender is most likely a phase sortal and as a phase sortal, it could not be part 
of our essence. None of these theories require us to see gender as essential, so for which ever 
theory you decide to adhere to, there would be no need to consider gender as part of our essence.  
Gender has been a part of society for as long as it can be remembered and regardless of whether we 
can successfully align its existence with personal identity theories, the concept of gender continues 
to influence the lives of every, single person. Even when we attempt to view the construction of 
people from a physical perspective, we cannot escape the effects that gender has on the way we 
behave and the way we are treated. Maybe it is that gender has become almost like the memes 
Richard Dawkins theorised about. According to Dawkins, a meme is a replicator that allows the 
human culture to continue and to be passed on through generations and countries? He thinks that 
human culture is “a new kind of replicator that has recently emerged on this very planet. It is staring 
us in the face It is still in its infancy, still drifting clumsily about in its primeval soup, but already it is 
achieving evolutionary change at a rate that leaves the old gene panting far behind” (Dawkins, 2006,  
p. 211). In other words, like genes pass biological elements and traits down through generations and 
cultures, memes do the same thing for culture, causing the spread of tunes, stories, language, 
religion, etc. Dawkins further calls these memes “mind viruses” (Dawkins, 2006, p. 229) in the sense 
that the existence and effects of these memes can actually be damaging to the human mind. If 
gender has no specific place within humanity’s existence, then maybe we can explain its perpetual 
existence through memes. Perhaps gender has been passed down through cultures and genders for 
thousands of years to the extent that we cannot imagine life without being gendered.  
Yet, even with the existence of memes, things that have been existing for generations, kept alive by 
memes, can be forgotten. Or maybe, as philosophers such as John Gray have suggested Dawkin’s 
theory is missing the idea of what a human is, maybe our cultures and constructions are deeper and 
more complex than just traditions. In fact, Gray actually suggested that memes are nothing like 
genes in the sense that they are not a physical construction and nor is there any evidence of the 
mechanism by which they could be passed down, Memes are unable to replicate themselves and 
only exist through the communication of people, whereas genes exist no matter what the 
environment or situation, as they are an inherited and intrinsic part of us. Gray continues by saying 
“no mechanism can be identified whereby memes replicate themselves and be transmitted with in 
or across cultures. Lacking any unit or mechanism of selection, the theory of memes is barely a 
theory at all” (Gray,2018, p. 21). In other words, if memes do exist, they have no physical destination 
or construction, they just explain what evolution can’t- they explain why we have traditions, folklore, 
and beliefs that are not physical or biological that stretch all over the world and throughout time.  
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Gender as a Meme  
  
  
Gender is perhaps a key example here, we struggle to find a strong, concrete physical basis for 
gender, yet It exists independently, globally and throughout our history. If we are entirely physical 
beings, then how and why would such a meme exist? Although Dawkins originally compared memes 
to genes because of the way they pass on information through generations, it seems that, that 
would be the only possible comparison between the two. Genes transmit purely factual, biological 
information whereas memes are responsible for the passing on of concepts like religion and gender 
yet, unlike genes, we cannot be entirely sure how they work. If memes pass on traditions and 
socially constructed concepts throughout humanity, then why is there such vast differences between 
cultural norms and traditions? For example, why does the concept of gender exist in every culture, 
but in such vastly different ways? Religion is said (by Dawkins) to be a meme, yet each religion has 
its own rules and traditions, regardless of which country you reside in. Is this because religions have 
empirical, physical texts and artifacts that influence the rules and practices it entails? If gender is 
somehow part of the human identity, then why does its form depend on what culture you are born 
in? Today, more and more people are becoming aware of the idea of “gender neutrality” and the 
number of genders one can assign to has raised drastically from the original two genders, to a 
sensational fifty-eight different gender categorisations (Goldman, 2014). Could it be possible that 
with the rising awareness of gender equality and gender neutrality, we are inevitably looking toward 
a future which will forget about gender? Will Gender eventually just cease to be transferred 
between generations? As Gray said, there is no visible way of understanding how memes are passed 
down or transferred, or really if they even exist at all. Is it too illogical to assert that as gender 
options grow and become more inclusive, there will be less need to label people?  
  
  
George Mead  
  
  
When I began this thesis, my aim was focused around understanding the place of gender, within the 
complex structure of personal identity. As my research progressed, my aim digressed into actually 
understanding whether or not gender exists as anything other than as a classification. My discovery 
was fascinating; although gender is undeniably omnipresent within our society, as a concept, it is 
virtually impossible to unequivocally associate with any personal identity theory. How does gender 
perpetually exist without any concrete, individual purpose? More importantly, as the previous 
chapters in this thesis have explained, if there is no successful way of explaining the existence of 
gender physically, or mentally… then how is it constructed within a person? Thus far, my research 
establishes that on all the main theories, Gender is not essential; yet, it is currently undeniably 
essential to the experiences we encounter as individuals, because the gender we ascribe to-and 
whether we chose to adhere to the social norms of said gender- impacts the way we are treated by 
others and the opportunities we receive.  
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Theories such as Judith Butlers “Heterosexual Matrix” (Butler,1990) indicates that those who adhere 
to social norms will have very different (and usually more positive) experiences than those who 
deviate from social norms. In this way, gender is not necessarily essential to personal identity but to 
the experiences that help us form our personal identity. Furthermore, if we approach the problem of 
gender in a similar way to the personal identity problem, then we have two methods of 
understanding its existence- psychologically or physically. The psychological understanding of gender 
seems to be a flawed position- although it makes sense to say that if our personal identities are 
sculpted by our consciousness and our experiences, then as something which dictates experience, 
gender can be explained psychologically. On the other hand, the Lockean concept of psychological 
continuity is a somewhat unreliable explanation- for example, it does not account of the fragility of 
the human memory. Also, there remains to be inescapable biological differences between men and 
women, and as gender is typically derivative of sex, it seems illogical to discount the vast differences 
-such as childbirth, hormonal variation and, even brain shape- that potentially may explain where 
the concept of men and women behaving in specific ways arose from. Nonetheless, the physical 
account of gender is also insufficient, for it does it not explain how gender is replicated or passed 
down through generations, nor why the existence and concepts of gender deviate so vastly 
depending on culture. The prominent existence of the transgender and transsexual community 
demonstrates that, for many, gender isn’t forgettable in light of purely physical theories. So, if 
gender can neither be effectively explained psychologically or physically, then how can we explain its 
prominent, omnipresent existence? It seems that the only feasible answer is that the existence of 
gender can be explained through social theories.  
George Mead’s theory of the mind, for example, begins by expressing the idea that in fact, the mind 
and body are not separate entities, as many philosophers have previously (and continuously) stated. 
He believed that the human organism develops a mind through interaction with the social 
environment. Thus then, the contingency of the mind is dependent upon the interaction between 
the human organism and its social environment (Mead, 1934, p. 191). So, in other words, without 
interaction between the human being and the environment in which they preside, the “mind” itself 
doesn’t develop. This means, therefore, without interaction with one’s environment we would not 
develop or be able to engage with experiences that form one’s “personal identity”- meaning that 
without one’s social existence there is little opportunity to experience what is needed to successfully 
develop one’s personal identity.  
This concept can be reinforced by elements of psychology too. There is a famous case study of a 
young girl named Genie whose parents kept her secluded from society in a basement and 
throughout her life, she never met or saw another person and her own parents didn’t ever speak to 
her due to an intolerance for noise (Fromkin, 1974, p. 84). According to the scans and investigations 
carried out on the child- once she was saved from her confinement- there was no evidence of her 
being born with any impairments (mental or physical) or disabilities: “she had a normal birth; she 
wasn’t born with any mental or learning difficulties” (Fromkin, 1974, p. 85). However, when Genie 
was saved from her cruel confinement, she wasn’t capable of speaking. The language areas of the 
brain are actually divided between “Wernicke's area and Broca's area (among other important 
language facilitating areas). Wernicke's area sits on the left side of the head (just above the ear) in 
the temporal lope, whereas the Broca area is located at the beginning of the frontal part of the brain  
(a bit further front). Wernicke's area is responsible for understanding speech and other 
communicative signals, whereas Broca's area is mainly in charge of producing grammatical 
sentences (alongside the motor area, which is needed to express what you want to say verbally— 
using lip movement and gestures, for instance)” (Brogaard, 2017).  
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This situation shows, psychologically, that there is a set time period to be able to develop language 
skills- this period is known as “the Critical Period”. In other words, this means without socialising and 
interacting with our environment we don’t actually develop the ability to communicate. 
Communication is vitally important for the construction of the human world we understand now, 
through communication we learn not only traditions, ideas, language and, development but it is also 
how we learn to understand our own identity and to identify those around us (Connell, 1985, p. 
240). Therefore, without existing in some sort of social circumstance, we are unable to communicate 
and without communication how are we to develop experiences that would shape our 
consciousness?  
Undeniably, it would be incredibly difficult to establish the existence of our own identity without any 
interaction with others. As John Locke described, our personal identity is a reflection of our 
consciousness, which is created through experiences, and without any kind of social interaction, our 
experiences would be immensely limited, meaning ultimately, that the development of our 
personality, preferences, interests and thoughts would be limited. This leads me to think that 
perhaps Mead’s theory is relevant here - as I discussed earlier in this thesis, if we tried to imagine a 
child bought up entirely away from society it seemed unlikely that they would comprehend what 
gender actually was-because they would have no experience of it so no way of understanding its 
existence- and this is reinforced by Mead’s theory. So then, like the mind, gender exists contingently 
to the society in which the people reside and without people talking about it or enacting it, it would 
actually cease to exist. So, then I have to ask, why does gender continue to exist?  
  
  
  
The Sex-Role theory  
  
The “Sex-role” theory suggests-as discussed by Mead and Parsons- that gender, is in, fact a social 
script which people learn and enact (Connell, 1985, p. 261). This theory explains the existence and 
perpetual use of normalised stereotypes. It connects the social structure with the formation of social 
personalities(identities) through the concept of “Role Making” through role learning and the process 
of internalisation (Connell, 1985, p. 262)- for example, women become feminine by learning the 
“female role” and of course men become masculine by learning the “male role”. It also leads to the 
identification of the “agencies of socialisation” that are responsible for the learning and continuation 
of these roles. These agencies are very prominent in our society; people such as teachers, parents, 
screenwriters, play-writes, advertisers and media and so this theory explains how the roles are 
perpetuated.  
However, although this theory explains and allows us to understand the continuation and existence 
of gender rules, the problem is that this theory is based upon the assumption that for those who 
deviate from these social expectations and stereotypes, there is punishment and reward for 
conforming. This idea, of course, is comparable with what Judith Butler said about the Heterosexual  
Matrix, the idea that there is a set of characteristics deemed normal by society and for anyone 
lacking those characteristics are seen as abnormal. In terms of the Sex-Role theory, according to 
Connell, “In role jargon, the occupants of counter- positions sanction role-performance” (Connell, 
1985, p. 263)- in other words, an example would be that boys are praised for aggression but then 
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ridiculed for feminine behaviours like compassion or just general “girlishness”. However, why do 
second parties apply these sanctions? This theory can, on the one hand, explain why the roles are 
the way that they are but not why these “secondary parties” apply these sanctions nor why there is 
an infinite regression within them. So, the only real way of explaining it would be about individual 
will- “ironically, the social dimension of the sex-role theory dissolves into voluntarism and into a 
generalized assumption that people chose to maintain customs,” (Connell, 1985, p. 263). This leads 
us to the second main critique of the sex-role theory, this criticism comes from the idea that the 
theory is static due to its lack of grasp on any structural constraint (Connell, 1985, p. 264).  
  
This doesn’t mean that advocates of this theory ignore change- for example, since the rise of 
feminism, focus has been set on changing the definitions of the “female sex” (Lipman- Bluman, 
2003) and similar considerations are made for the understanding of the existence of the male role 
(Pleck, 1981). In fact, the problem is, the “theory doesn’t allow the comprehension of social change 
as history, that is, as transformation generated in the inter-play of social practice and social 
structure” (Connell, 1985, p. 264). Change impinges on sex roles; it affects them rather than being 
incorporated by them. For example, I earlier mentioned the idea of Hypermasculinity which is the 
over-exaggeration of typically male characteristics to over-compensate for the lack of requirement 
of these characteristics in the workplace, with the development of office work replacing physically 
laborious jobs which have thus replaced the ability to express strength and comradery within the 
workplace. The fact that hypermasculinity exists shows that gender-roles haven’t caught up with the 
nature of the more modern society, as it is a response to the lack of need for traditional stereotypes. 
This means that one’s gender isn’t dependent on the classifications of society. So, if behaviour 
develops and then the expectation of gender has to catch up, this then means that rather than 
identity being based upon gender, in fact, behaviour births the expectations of the gender. For 
example, since the economy now relies upon office or “softer” jobs, it is no longer the common 
occupation for men to spend long, dark shifts in a mine or be working dusk till dawn on the land 
meaning the qualities needed to be successful to this kind of occupation are also being diminished. 
Instead, these qualities are being replaced by the I.T and communication skills needed to work in the 
average office setting – even the work clothes have been changed from dirty overalls or dungarees 
to suits and crisp white shirts. Therefore, the change in behaviour displayed by the average man has 
of course, almost completely transformed, however through the existence of things like  
Hypermasculinity, we can see that the gender classification hasn’t in fact caught up with the change 
in typical “male” behaviours. The same idea ,of course, applies for females; the well-known 
stereotypical female role revolves around, mainly, domesticated ideas- being maternal, house-work, 
etc- whereas of course, today, women are undertaking more and more corporate positions yet it is 
still deemed as relatively abnormal for a woman to lack domestic skills, or to lack compassion or 
empathy of some kind.  
Therefore, gender is not part of our personal identity because our behaviours and experiences 
dictate the construction of gender itself, rather than the other way around. Although gender is 
socially constructed, gender is constructed from, and by, us. Without our behaviours, our opinions 
and stereotypes, gender does not exist- it is bought alive by our consciousness. Within the “Sex-role 
theory”, change is an impingement. It comes from the outside and alters the construction of the 
roles themselves. Furthermore, change comes from “inside” – i.e. the “real-self protesting artificial 
restriction and constraining roles” (Connell, 1985, p. 263). This is further evidence that gender is 
contingent on the nature and construction of the mind, rather than existing as some sort of separate 
entity.  
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So, if gender is a construction of the mind, does this mean it is a construction of us? If gender is a 
behaviour and response to social circumstance, then as a baby we are unable to behave as anything 
more than with fundamental human activities- breathing, eating, etc… and thus cannot behave as a 
gender. Therefore, if babies are not capable of acting as a gender, and as we’ve already discussed 
gender is neither mentally nor physically constructed, then where does the babies’ gender come 
from? Of course, the obvious answer, is the parents, the guardians or the families the babies are 
born in to. The babies’ gender is established from the toys they are given, the clothes they are 
dressed in and the behaviours they are taught. When a woman tells the world she is pregnant, one 
of the first questions people ask is “are you having a boy or a girl?” or “what are you expecting?” 
(Hill, 2018). Asking whether or not a new-born is a “little boy or girl” is not only a question of the 
baby’ gender but is also affiliated with the way the baby is raised and treated- for example, it is 
common practice for little girls to wear pink clothes, or have dolls or have a room decorated with 
pink or princesses. For a parent or family to decide the gender of their baby before it is even born or 
even able to form its own opinions or perspective on their identity, it is like deciding whether this 
baby will be heterosexual or not- or whether or not it will like Classical music. Not only does the 
decision of gender impact the infant’s life experiences, but also the way the child dresses, what toys 
they play with and the environment they are exposed to. All of these questions, especially regarding 
gender, is indeterminable before the child has actually experienced the world and developed 
enough to make their independent judgements. Rather than dictating the infant’s gender, before it 
is even a viable human being, by calling them a “little girl” or a “little boy”, it would make more 
sense to call this child a little person- allowing them the chance to decide their own gender (or 
whether or not to ascribe to one in the first place) (Hill, 2018). By assigning a gender to a new-born 
baby, we dictate the way their lives will unfold-down to the smallest details of what clothes they will 
be dressed in- and this then goes on to ascertain how many elements of their social existence will be 
constructed. If we treated babies as “little people”, removing the stereotypical and gendered 
traditions of specific colours and toys, etc then there wouldn’t be development into more serious 
elements, such as careers and temperaments. Without gendering babies or children and removing 
furthermore removing stereotypical gendered behaviours, people wouldn’t have to choose to live 
inside or outside the social norms. Biological males could have softer, nurturing traits or wear 
dresses or makeup without being treated, or feeling, like a social outcast.  
So, if gender is affixed to our existence before we even learn to breathe independently, then can we 
say it is part of our identity? As all the research I have explored so far suggests, personal identity 
reflects our consciousness, which to many people, is a further reflection of one’s experiences in life- 
so how can something be part of our identity which we, in fact, never actually had any experience of 
before it became part of us? Like any other classification, gender is something that is given to us by 
the opinions of others which then continues to influence our lives, decisions and, opinions. I 
discussed earlier the idea that the conformation toward a gender allows people to reach the 
optimum potential (Maslow, 1943, p. 389)- but this is only whilst gender is reinforced by society. If, 
hypothetically, of course, gender slipped from existence within society then would people stop being 
able to reach self-actualisation? Of course, it wouldn’t. Gender only promotes self- actualisation 
through approval and a sense of belonging whilst it exists as a “social-norm”, for whilst these social 
norms exist there is a sense of deviation and conformation which dissipates entirely with the 
removal of the social-norm itself. This is what makes gender such a difficult concept to understand 
entirely; its roots lie in the perception of others but perpetuate through the mind of the individual 
and its existence relies upon people either choosing to deny or accept the social standards it entails.  
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The existence of gender throughout history is far more understandable than the reasons for its 
current existence. In past society, within the existence of a dominating patriarchy it seems rather 
obvious as to why there would be a distinction between the two genders; without this distinction, 
there would be no domination of either gender- “More than all men's individual actions, patriarchy 
is simultaneously the process, structure, and ideology of women's subordination. While different 
aspects of women's subordination are teased out and dissected, the connections among the parts 
are left to ‘patriarchy’” (Lorber, 1994, p. 3). This reminds me of Rorty’s explanation for philosophy- if 
we had come from a different historical, social background we may never have reached a point 
where gender exists within our lives. Much like Rorty’s understanding of philosophy, gender has no 
clear cut explanation, barely any empirical standing and can often be outweighed by logical 
explanations( for example, although science and psychology shows that the differences between 
males and females are not that expansive, the perpetuation of gender continues to cause an 
increasingly large distance between the two (Lorber, 1994, p. 4)). Seemingly then, as Rorty said 
about Philosophy, if we were to come from different social circumstances then we wouldn’t have 
the problem of gender; without the history of primary industry that relied on the strength and 
laborious work of men because of the necessity for the females to reproduce and nurture, then the 
divide between the two sexes may never have led to the divided existence of gender roles. This 
point was also reiterated by the conclusion of Charlotte Witt’s theory of Uniessentialism, in other 
words, as an entity of our existence that may have not been and as a construction that is specific to 
our current social situation, it could also mean that gender is not essential to our social identity 
either. How are we supposed to ever truly understand gender when its existence is contingent on 
something as fragile as a social construction- it is highly feasible that society could change in future 
years meaning gender would become surplus, and if this is the case, then why should we make such 
an issue of it now? If gender is so complex and there is the potentiality that it may become obsolete 
in the future, then why do we place such emphasis on its construction and the effect it has upon our 
lives? If this last question leaves us in any doubt, perhaps one should consider the differentiation 
between gender roles between countries, religions and - in some cases- families; Judith Butler 
suggested that there being only one classification for every “woman” and every “man” was illogical 
given the breadth and depth of qualities that members of both genders have that are individual to 
them (Lorber, 1994, p. 6).  
So, then gender is constructed by mankind the same way as money, language religion and 
technology (Lorber, 1994, p. 7) which is to serve a purpose – language enables communication, 
religion encourages moralistic behaviour, technology allows economic development and of course 
money not only enables trade but establishes a hierarchy ; so gender is a manmade construction 
born to explain the differences between the two sexes- rooted in the division between these sexes 
through the state of the economy and types occupation available, as well as biological differences 
such as childbirth. Although in many cases, my thesis has shown the conceptualization of gender to 
be too extreme -and often old-fashioned- its prominence within our social identities is undeniable.  
  
  
  
  
Conclusion  
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Conclusively, it seems to me that gender is not cohesive with the ideas we currently have of personal 
identity, not because it is not part of our construction but because it is part of a whole new part of 
our identification- it is part of our social existence. From my research, it is apparent to me that 
gender exists through the needs and concepts of the society (hence why gender can change so vastly 
in different cultures) and therefore its existence is entirely sociological. No traditional or 
contemporary theory of the metaphysics of personal identity provides any good reason to think that 
gender is essential to what we are, even if essentialism is true. On the one hand, it is understandable 
how certain, stereotypical gender norms have been formed-based on biological capacity and 
construction-. It is understandable why women have been portrayed and expected to be soft and 
nurturing, alongside the stoic strength of the working male. However, as cultures and societies have 
adapted and developed, our concept of gender has become somewhat outdated. I posed a question 
in an earlier chapter about whether the child who had been raised entirely independent from any 
society; would they have a concept of their own gender … or even what gender was at all? The 
answer is that they most likely would not. Without living in a set society, there would be no 
expectation to behave in a certain way because of their sex organs or ascribed gender- the child’s 
temperament and personality would develop independently of any expectations or cultural 
responsibilities. The child, let’s say born a biological man, may still develop the stereotypical male 
characteristics, or may be the complete antithesis but there would still be no prejudice or social 
constraint to prevent or change this. This is because, as we have already seen, gender is not 
biologically inside us, nor is it part of our DNA and neither are we instantaneously born with a 
gender. Gender cannot and will not, exist without socialisation or interaction- meaning that gender 
itself is not essentially part of our, individual personal identity which explains why we cannot 
understand it through essentialism, physicalism or through psychological explanations.  
However, as modern individuals we are also inevitably bound into social engagement – our 
livelihoods, family relationships and even essential things such as buying food may mean speaking to 
cashiers or supermarket staff. In this day and age, our whole lives revolve in a circle of socialisation, 
gone are the days where a man could spend days without speaking to another soul, fetching and 
foraging for his own food. Even, in this day and age, with the development of social media and 
instant communications, we are embarked on the potential for twenty-four-hour communication 
and interaction. So, if this social interaction, does indeed contingently but non-essentially develop 
our personal identity, then living in societies such as ours, means that the development of our 
personal identity is inevitable and as a result, so is gender- for if personal identity is inevitable due to 
social interaction and gender is created by the social identity that results in said interaction, then, at 
this point in time, it would be virtually impossible to have one construct without the other.  
Furthermore, case studies such as the Genie case I referred to earlier, show that for people who 
have had no, or very little, social interaction, there is critical and often irreversible stunting of their 
development- it has been shown that without adequate social interaction, a person’s intelligence 
will be lower, they will be more likely to suffer psychological and physiological distress and will 
permanently struggle to communicate and comprehend (Martin, 2009). This reinforces George 
Mead’s theory, suggesting that without social interaction and social presence, we will be unable to 
progress and achieve and thus our life experience would be immensely limited. If our lives are so 
restricted and unfulfilled, if we could not communicate or understand, then this would severely 
impact the development of our personal identities. Regardless of one’s opinions of how personal 
identity is constructed, one cannot argue with the fact that with all these impediments, we would 
have a remarkably different identity because of the different, more expansive experiences we would 
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have. Without social interaction, we would live an incredibly different life, which would make us 
entirely different people. Therefore, we cannot deny that the experiences of social interaction shape 
our identity, which in turn shapes our gender which affects the way our entire lives progress.  
   
To approach my original question of whether or not gender is part of our personal identity, my 
answer has been altered by my research. I now further understand that on an individual, human 
level -gender has a complex role upon our identity. My earlier question was what would happen if 
someone awoke tomorrow morning in the opposite gendered body, would this person be different 
or just the same person they always were? My original research into essentialism, psychical theories 
and psychological continuity theories suggested that the person would be in fact the same person as 
they always were, just with a new potential for different experiences and expectations. To take a 
new path which might ultimately lead a change in their personal identity- but not an instantaneous 
change, and not an essential one either. However, when we add the existence of one’s social 
identity and each of our places within the society we live, the answer does change slightly. At this 
moment in time, gender affects the way we dress, the way we behave and the way we are treated 
by others, so gender is more of an external classification, rather than internal. Therefore, when 
awaking in a different gendered body, it is rational to assume that to other people, you would start 
to look different, be classified differently and so in other words, you’d be socially different. As 
already established, our social existence has an undeniably strong presence throughout our lives, so 
if we are socially different, we inevitably will become different. Social structures are contingent, 
however.  
We are recognised by the way we appear and the way we present ourselves to the world; facial 
recognition technology, passports and even situations such as recognising each other in the street, 
relies on the way we look, or, at the very least, the way we present ourselves. Imagine seeing 
someone walking down the street who is physically unfamiliar to you but this person halts you and 
greets you the way that your oldest friend would- this person can relay the same stories, has the 
same opinions and has the same characteristics as the friend you have always known, but physically 
they are a stranger to you. Although, of course, after interacting with your friend you may start to 
recognise them from the things that they say and the memories they hold, it would still be a difficult 
recognition without any physical similarity between the person you originally knew and the person 
who is greeting you in the street. From the friend’s perspective, they have upheld their own life 
experiences, their own memories and their consciousness has continued in the same way it did 
before any physical change. However, to those around them, this person is unrecognisable without 
interaction. This reinforces my earlier suggestion that certain elements of one’s identity exist 
through interaction, rather than independently. This concept also demonstrates the fact that 
although our own personal identity is the key, necessary part of our own construction, and that for 
the most part our physical appearance is not part of said personal identity, yet we still require 
elements of physical identity to be recognisable as ourselves and without being recognisable as 
ourselves do we really have a strong sense of identity, to begin with?  
As an element of our lives that affects the way we are treated and the way we are recognised, at this 
current moment, gender is one of the most important elements in our social existence.  
Furthermore, as a classification of social behaviour and status, gender affects the way we are treated 
which then effects the way we think and thus ultimately the way we behave. My summation of 
gender is to say that at current, gender is not essential to our personal identity, but it is essential to 
our social identity, which is hugely influential upon our personal identity. Gender is an outdated 
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classification of society, at this point in our existence, gender serves no purpose but to limit and 
restrict the way people live their lives. It is the leftovers of a formerly constrained society, who 
needed laborious strength and careful nurturing to coexist. Yet, now we live in a community where 
the major population of adults spends their lives behind a desk, men and women side by side 
completing the same tasks in the same environment but in that same world, we act prejudiced 
against male being too emotive or treat him like an outcast for wanting to wear a skirt. We treat 
women as a sperate race for dressing in overtly masculine attire, or for not wanting to reproduce. 
However, this is not to say that I think gender will continue to be as important for our identity as it is 
right now; within our current society we have seen the emergence of the acceptance of the idea of 
gender neutrality and if we explored the idea of gender in other countries, religions, and continents 
we are met with a plethora of different and sometimes opposing ideas that are susceptible to 
change and evolution. It suggests that as a non-concrete element of social existence that is, over 
time, becoming less strict with its classifications, gender may one day become obsolete both to our 
personal identities and our social existence but, for now, gender remains one of the most important 
contingent aspects of our identity.  
I have shown that no serious metaphysical account of personal identity requires us to think that 
gender is essential to our identities. Some may be more conducive to this view than others, but none 
is remotely committed to it. Whether you think our identity is determined by an immaterial soul, our 
physical bodies, our physical (or even non-physical) historical origins, or a stream of continuous 
conscious experiences, there is still no compelling reason to hold that gender is essential to what we 
are. In addition, of course, if you reject essentialism, like Quine and Rorty, then this is immediately 
out of the question. And yet we live in a society in which people act as if gender is essential. That is 
why it has become so important to people and can have a seriously harmful effect on some people's 
lives. However, the attitude is not backed up by rational philosophical reflection.   
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